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This MA thesis has as its main goal to solve issues that stem from a research tradition 
regarding Plato’s theory of justice in the Republic. I have located three prominent issues that 
remain areas of interest throughout the research tradition, and I will give an analysis of 
these problems as well as give my own contributions to how to best solve these issues.  
To do this I will first give a short thematic summary of the dialogue. As part of this 
thematic summary I will give short overviews of the political and dramaturgical aspects of 
the Republic. I have done this in order to best understand key passages in the dialogue that 
have been used by the scholars I highlight, as well as passages I use myself, it is important to 
understand the context surrounding these passages. The dialogue is not only a work in moral 
psychology, and as such it is important when one analyses the moral aspects of the text to 
see these as part of a more complex philosophical work. 
I give short presentations of the three problems before moving on to the scholarly 
articles that deal with these problems. The problems are: The problem of relevance, the 
problem of motivation, and the problem of possibility. The core of the problem of relevance 
is the claim by David Sahcs1 that Socrates does not address and praise the same kind of 
justice as Glaucon and Adeimantus wants him to praise at the start of Book II. 
The problem of motivation stems from a question of who has the incentive to act 
just, and why one should act just for the sake of justice itself. The primary concern regarding 
the problem of motivation is why the philosopher king has to be forced to rule the ideal city, 
when it is just that he does. The problem of possibility must seek to answer to which extent 
justice is available to everyone. There is no need to strive to be just if it is unattainable, so in 
order to be relevant Socrates must also show that everyone can (at least to some degree) be 
just. 
 I give short summaries of a specific set of articles that cover these issues, written by 
prominent scholars over a span of over fifty years. The scholars I present articles from are: 
David Sachs, Raphael Demos, Gregory Vlastos, Richard Kraut, John M. Cooper, Julia Annas, 
Normann O. Dahl, Eric Brown, Rachel G. K. Singpurwalla, and Rachana Kamtekar. 
                                                          
1 Sachs 1963 
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 Building on the articles presented, I then argue for my own solutions to the three 
problems taking into account the articles by the aforementioned scholars, an extended list 
of articles, and my own understanding and thoughts on the primary source material, i.e. the 
Republic (as well as passages from the Phaedrus, the Gorgias, and the Symposium). 
 I conclude that there is not one single approach which can completely solve the 
issues at hand, my answer is therefore to combine several different approaches into a 
coherent whole that can go further towards solving the problems.  
 This thesis can hopefully serve as a thorough introduction to the problems I believe 
are the most prominent in the Republic in regards to moral psychology, and suggest new 
possible ways to solve the problem of relevance, the problem of motivation, and the 























Abstract - Norwegian 
 
Denne masteroppgaven har som hovedmål å løse problemer som stammer fra en 
forskningstradisjon vedrørende Platons teori om rettferdighet i Staten. Jeg har lokalisert tre 
sentrale problemer som har gjennomgående vært fokusområder i forskningstradisjonen. Jeg 
vil gi en analyse av disse problemene, samt gi mine egne bidrag til hvordan man best kan 
løse disse problemene.  
For å gjøre dette vil jeg først gi et kort tematisk sammendrag av dialogen, og som en 
del av dette sammendraget vil jeg fremheve de politiske- og dramaturgiske aspektene i 
Staten. Dette har jeg gjort for å gi en bedre forståelse av konteksten til nøkkelpassasjer i 
dialogen som blir brukt av akademikerne jeg baserer mine syn på, samt passasjer jeg bruker 
selv. Fordi Staten ikke utelukkende er et moralsk-psykologisk verk er det en rekke passasjer 
som må sees i en bredere kontekst. 
Jeg gir korte presentasjoner av de tre problemene før jeg går gjennom 
forskningstradisjonen. Problemene består av: ‘The problem of relevance’, ‘the problem of 
motivation’, ‘and the problem of possibility’. Kjernen av «The problem of relevance» er 
David Sachs’ beskyldining om at Socrates ikke addresserer og priser det samme konseptet av 
rettferdighet som Glaucon og Adeimantus ber ham prise i starten av Bok II. «The problem of 
motivation» kan best forklares som hvorfor man skal handle rettferdig for rettferdigheten 
selv, ikke for hva som kommer fra å handle rettferdig. Et hovedfokus ved dette problemet er 
å forklare hvorfor filosofkongen må tvinges til å styre byen når det er rettferdig at han styrer. 
«The problem of possibility» tar for seg til hvilken grad alle mennesker kan oppnå å bli 
rettferdige, det vil ikke være noen grunn til å strebe etter rettferdighet om det er 
uoppnåelig. Så for å være relevant må Sokrates vise at alle (i alle fall til noen grad) kan være 
rettferdige. 
 Jeg gir korte sammendrag av artikler som utgjør et relevant bilde på 
forskningshistorien rundt disse problemene, med fokus på passasjer vedrørende de tre 
problemene og kritikk av disse passasjene. De relevante akademikerne er: David Sachs, 
Raphael Demos, Gregory Vlastos, Richard Kraut, John M. Cooper, Julia Annas, Normann O. 
Dahl, Eric Brown, Rachel G. K. Singpurwalla, and Rachana Kamtekar. 
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Basert på artiklene, en utvidet liste med lignende artikler, og mine egne teorier og 
syn på Platon’s tekster (i tillegg til Staten referer jeg til Phaedrus, Gorgias, og Symposion) 
presenterer jeg mine egne bidrag til løsninger på problemene. 
 Jeg konkluderer oppgaven ved å anerkjenne at det ikke finnes en enkel teori eller 
vinkling som løser alle problemene på en tilstrekkelig måte, min løsning er derfor å flette 
sammen ulike teorier og vinklinger til en stor sammenhengende løsning på problemene. Jeg 
gjør dette ved å bygge videre på de teoriene jeg mener er mest sannsynlige, samt ved å 
legge til egne vinklinger på dialogen og problemene. 
Oppgaven har som mål å være en god introduksjon til de mest fremtredende 
problemene ved rettferdighetsteorien til Platon i Staten, og presentere en ny mulighet til 


























The aim of this thesis is to solve three related issues regarding Plato’s theory of justice in the 
Republic. Rachel Singpurwalla acknowledges the existence of all three problems in her article 
“Plato's Defense of Justice in the Republic”2, but to the best of my knowledge I am the first 
to systematically align these problems as equal issues in Plato’s theory.   
In 1963 David Sahcs wrote an article called “A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic”3 that 
questioned whether Socrates remains consistent in his defence of justice in regards to what 
he is actually tasked with by Glaucon and Adeimantus. The problem Sachs identifies has led 
several scholars to come to Plato’s defence, and in my study of the Republic, and the 
research tradition that follows from Sachs’ article, I have identified three related issues that 
must be answered to fully defend Plato’s theory. First one must show that Socrates’ 
conception of justice does not differ so much from the initial conception discussed up until 
he is issued the task of praising justice “in itself” (358d), that he in fact ends up praising 
something completely different than what he was tasked. Secondly one must present 
evidence that Socrates demonstrates how justice is inherently good by itself (358a), and that 
any motivation for acting just cannot come exclusively from the consequences from acting 
justly. Finally it must be shown that Socrates believes everyone to be capable of being just, 
not only the rulers of an ideal state. Because the core argumentation of the Republic consists 
of defending why one should seek to be just, it needs to be shown that everyone can in fact 
become just. If justice is unattainable to all but a select few in a place that does not exist in 
the physical world, then it appears that the search for justice serves no applicable purpose, 
and no one will have any reason to try to be just. 
  I have structured the thesis so that I first give a general thematic summary of the 
dialogue as a whole, and in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the 
subject-matter and the setting from which the arguments arise, I present short chapters 
about the political and dramaturgical aspects of the Republic. It is essential to understand 
the different aspects of the work in order to fully grasp the different arguments that are 
presented by the different characters. 
                                                          
2 Singpurwalla 2006, she is primarily concerned with showing why and how Plato’s theory deals with 
interpersonal relationships, i.e. how one can be sure that a just person will treat other people justly. 
3 Sachs 1963 
10 
 
 I then give a thorough outline of the different scholars that have made strong 
contributions over the decades to the ongoing debate. Starting with Sachs’ article from 1963 
and ending with Kamtekar’s article from 2010. The articles I highlight have all been chosen 
because of their lasting importance in the debate, as well as their different views.4 This is to 
highlight different approaches that have been made in an effort to best understand Plato’s 
writing as well as to illustrate that it is a highly debatable subject that appears to have no 
clear cut solution. The range in articles that all share to a great extent the same subject 
matter, shows that the questions I have chosen to answer remains a topic for debate in 
ancient philosophy to this day. 
 Directly following the review of previous research articles I present my own 
arguments and solutions regarding the different problems. My solutions include some of 
what I believe are the most fruitful theories from previous contributors while also adding 
remarks of my own in order to solve any shortcomings earlier articles may have suffered 
from. A few of the aspects regarding the solutions are purely my own ideas on the subjects, 
but all my solutions have elements from previous articles in them. I see the problems in the 
Republic as very intricate, and I believe that in order to give the most beneficial defence of 
Plato one must view the different interpretations that have emerged in the research history 
as contributions to a larger whole. My approach is to take what I believe are the best 
solutions, and rearrange them alongside my own thoughts to create a more comprehensive 
look at the Republic and how the problems can be solved. 
 I conclude the thesis by presenting my full view on the problems as a whole and how 
my proposed solutions can be viewed as a consistent solution to the issues that I have 
identified. Sachs’ points out an issue that he claims leaves Socrates defence irrelevant, and 
scholars have primarily been concerned with showing why Socrates remains consistent. In 
my view the defence against Sachs is just the first issue that must be solved in regards to 
Plato’s theory. As I will illustrate in detail when I introduce the problems in chapter V there 
are issues directly linked to the problem of relevance that each, if not taken into 
                                                          
4 Some articles have been left out because the approaches have been better formulated (in my view) by the 
scholars I present in detail in this paper. Christopher Reeve for example presents a very similar as John Cooper 
does in regards to why the philosopher would chose to rule. See Reeve 1988. The view in question is that the 
philosopher will realize that it is in only in the ideal city he will get the maximum possible time to contemplate 
the Forms, Cooper argues better for this by adding that the philosopher will also see that the time available to 
him for contemplation is directly linked to him ruling, and as such it is just that he contribute the best way he 
can to the society that allows him to contemplate the Forms to such an extent. 
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consideration, leaves Plato’s theory vulnerable for inconsistencies/critique. The main 
connection between the three problems is that they are all concerned with the initial 
































II: Thematic Summary of the Republic 
 
The main focus of the Republic is to explore the concept of justice, to fully understand what 
justice entails and to refute any notion that injustice is a benefit to its possessor. Book I, in 
many ways, functions as its own dialogue, in which Socrates refutes notions of justice 
presented by three interlocutors: Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus, all of whom 
claim in some form or another that there exists no inherent value in justice and that 
everyone would want to act unjustly if they could do so without negative consequences. 
Cephalus attests that he has reached an age where it is natural to think of death, and 
because death may be imminent he fears that previous acts of injustice will haunt him in the 
afterlife (330e-d). Polemarchus maintains that justice must consist of actions, and initially 
believes that justice can be defined as “giving each what is owed to him” (331e-332a), but 
after agreeing that there does exist situations where one should not return something one 
has borrowed (332a) the definition is changed to that “it gives benefits to friends and does 
harm to enemies” (332d). This theory however falls short when Socrates makes the point 
that it could never be just to cause harm to others (335a-e), but before Polemarchus and 
Socrates can continue to uncover truths about the nature of justice Thrasymachus bursts 
into the conversation and proclaim that they “act like idiots to give way to one another” 
(336b). Thrasymachus believes that “justice is nothing more than the advantage of the 
stronger” (338c), i.e. that justice is whatever the people in power says it is. The three 
interlocutors all share a common understanding of justice that it is mainly worth performing 
because of what comes from acting justly, whether it be a better position in the afterlife, a 
better renown amongst friends and enemies alike, or if it betters one’s position with the 
ruler(s) and as such one’s position in society. Socrates finds flaws in each of their approaches 
but he does not present a solid theory himself. The reason for this, as well as the difference 
between Book I and the rest of the dialogue, will be discussed more closely in ‘The 
dramaturgical aspect of the Republic’ (chapter IV). 
 Book II starts with Glaucon pleading with Socrates to prove that it is better to be just 
than to be unjust, because, although he wants justice to be the better of the two, he feels, as 
Thrasymachus and the previous interlocutors, that injustice is only avoided because of the 
constraints society places on one. Socrates claims he holds justice in the very highest regards 
and says he will show that justice is something one should want not only for all the benefits 
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that comes from acting justly, but that the just acts in themselves are worth performing for 
their own sake. This initial discussion of justice takes up the bulk of Book II, III, and IV. 
Socrates argues that it will be easiest to identify justice if one constructs an ideal city, and 
then transfers the concept of justice from the city to the individual (368e-369a). Upon 
identifying the other chief virtues (wisdom, courage, and moderation) whatever remains in 
the city will be justice (428a), this turns out to be “the having and doing of one’s own” (433e-
434a). 
The ideal city will consist of three classes: The producers (craftsmen, farmers, 
artisans, etc.), the auxiliaries (soldiers, warriors), and the guardians (rulers). These three 
classes must work in harmony for the city to be just, the guardians must rule, the auxiliaries 
must follow the rule of the guardians, and the producers must fulfil professions most suited 
to their natural abilities. Justice is in this regard a sort of principle of specialization 
summarized by the phrase “doing one’s own”, and in the city this means fulfilling one’s role 
in the society and refraining from intervening with other people’s performance of their roles.  
 Having identified justice in the city Socrates transfers the concept to the individual 
(434d), and identifies corresponding parts from the city within the soul (435b-441c). The 
soul, like the ideal city, consist of three parts that must function in harmony in order for 
justice to reign. Reason must rule the soul (like the guardians must rule the city), spirit must 
follow reason’s rule (like the auxiliaries assist the guardians), and appetite must be guided by 
reason and spirit to want the right things and refrain from damaging the soul by becoming 
too prominent. Just as the just city must be guided by the just philosopher kings, so must the 
soul be ruled by reason (441c-443b). 
 Book V, VI, and VII elaborate on the lifestyle, the education, and the proper rule of 
the philosopher kings. The three allegories of the dialogue are also presented in these books, 
called ‘the sun’ (508b–509c), ‘the line’ (509d-511e), and ‘the cave’ (514a-520a). These 
allegories are all meant to illustrate the philosopher kings’ correct rule, how the Forms 
function, and how the philosopher kings will make use of these Forms. It is revealed that the 
world as a whole is split into two realms, the physical world is the one we experience on 
earth, and the intelligible world is the world of the Forms (476a-b). A main difference 
between these two worlds is the ever changing nature of the physical world and the never 
changing nature of the world of Forms. For Plato this means that no true knowledge can 
come from the physical world, for something to qualify as knowledge it must be constant, 
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and seeing as the physical world contains only constantly changing copies of the perfect 
Forms it is impossible to have true knowledge of anything in the physical world, it is only 
possible to have knowledge of the Forms (476d).5 
 In Book VIII Socrates discusses the hierarchical order of the different types of 
government, starting with an aristocratic society ruled by just leaders, this rule will 
eventually devolve to the next level of government. This will happen to each form of rule, 
moving from aristocracy through timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and eventually the worst 
form of rule, tyranny (544e-545a).  
Socrates detailed description of the soul of the tyrant starts off Book IX (571a-573c). 
Socrates explains that the tyrant is the absolute counterpart to the philosopher king, the 
tyrant being completely ruled by his appetites while the philosopher king is being ruled by 
reason and keeps his appetites thoroughly under control (577d-579e). This inner difference 
is in Plato’s view a good example of why one should be just for justice’s own sake, to 
enhance one’s inner harmony and further develop reason’s rule. Socrates offers three 
reasons to why it is desirable to be just. The first is that the psychological portrait of the 
tyrant reveals how injustice will torture the inner harmony of the soul, in comparison to the 
just soul which is calm and untroubled (580b-c). Secondly, the philosopher is shown to have 
superior knowledge of what is truly the most pleasurable life because of his ability to 
experience all the three different pleasures valued by the three different classes. The 
guardians will conclude that it is their life that is the most pleasant (582a-583a). Lastly, 
because it is the philosopher that can say with certainty what is pleasurable, and it is decided 
that only the philosophical life is truly pleasurable, the other ways of life are at best 
cessation of pain (583b-587b). 
 In Book X Socrates speaks to great length of banishing the poets all together, because 
they are imitators that don’t know anything about the truth (595a-608b). By banishing the 
poets one avoids that the masses of the ideal city imitate the incorrect portrayal of the true, 
good nature of different things, which would in turn make them stray from the just life.  
                                                          
5 Both the education of the guardians and the existent of the Forms have been used by different scholars to 
defend Plato’s theory. I will rely both these aspects in my own solutions to the problem. Because this passage is 
meant as a thematic summary of the work I will not go into details about different interpretations of these 
aspects here, but will return to them several times in my walkthrough of the research tradition as well as in my 
proposed solutions at the end of this thesis. 
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The Book, and the dialogue, ends with the myth of Er and elaborates on the afterlife 

































III: The Political Aspect of the Republic 
 
Beside the aspects of moral psychology, the Republic does also contain a solid work of 
political philosophy. To better understand the subject of this thesis, Plato’s theory of justice, 
it is important to understand the fuller picture that is created in the dialogue. Instead of 
locating the passages that directly apply to the moral psychology of the work, one must view 
them as part of a whole. Plato creates the ideal political system in order to locate justice in a 
society before using this creation as an analogy of individual justice. When discussing justice 
in the Republic it is impossible to keep the political aspects out of the discussion. Socrates 
makes politics such a vital part of finding and defining justice that it would be absolutely 
remiss of me if I did not give a short overview of the most important pieces of political 
philosophy found in the dialogue. Because Socrates starts his search for justice in the 
political arena before moving to individual justice, illustrated by the analogy of city and soul 
(368e-369a), it is important to include a view of the political importance of the Republic to 
better understand his moral theory. 
 I will, as Eric Brown does in his article “Plato's Ethics and Politics in The Republic”6, 
focus mainly on the creation of the ideal political body – the Kallipolis – and the critique 
Socrates makes in regards to other forms of government. 
 
III.1 The ideal city 
 
In order to identify something Socrates says that it is easiest to identify something small if 
one could look at it in a larger scale, and because “the justice of a single man [is the same as] 
the justice of a whole city” (368e) it will be easier to identify justice in the larger arena of the 
city, and then apply the findings to the individual (369a). 
 Book II through IV largely focuses on establishing this ideal city where justice will be 
available for identification. I will say here that the ideal city indeed is a political institution, 
but not an institution that can come to be in the physical world. I agree with Miles F. 
Burnyeat7 in his assessment that the ideal city first and foremost is a tool for identifying 
                                                          
6 Brown 2011 
7 Burnyeat 1999 
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justice, not as a proposed new form of government8. As shown by the decay of governments 
it would eventually lead to tyranny, if one reads the passages in question to mean that all 
forms of government eventually decays into another, lower form, which I do. Primarily based 
on the passage at 546a: When discussing how the ideal city may change, Socrates makes the 
following note: “…everything that comes into being must decay.” (546a). I see this as a clear 
indication that if the ideal city indeed were to be established it would eventually descend 
through the ranks of the lower forms of government. Socrates also makes the remark here 
that: 
 
…the people you have educated to be leaders in your city [the philosopher kings], even 
though they are wise, still won’t, through calculation together with sense perception, hit 
upon the fertility and barrenness of the human species, but it will escape them, and so 
they will at some time beget children when they ought not to do so.9 
  
I read this passage to indicate that nothing will ever last eternally in the physical world 
because of faults in human nature. Socrates explains that even the guardians that have been 
perfectly educated in the ideal city will eventually make mistakes that will lead to changes. 
Socrates first describes the outlines of a city that serves only the base needs of its 
inhabitants, and says that the citizens of this city will “live in peace and good health” (372c), 
yet Glaucon says immediately after this that if Socrates were to construct a city for pigs it 
would be outlined in the same fashion (372d). This objection by Galucon leads to the 
construction of the second city, a city initially viewed in poor light by Socrates, called “a 
luxurious city” (372e). Socrates also says: “Yet the true city, in my opinion, is the one we’ve 
described, the healthy one, as it were. But let’s study a city with a fever, if that’s what you 
want.” (372e-373a) Socrates starts the creation of this city with the aim of studying a 
fevered city, but he ends up identifying a concept of justice in this city: “…we had hit upon 
the origin and pattern of justice right at the beginning in founding our city.” (443b-c). Justice 
being defined as internal harmony and each part of a person each doing its own and not 
meddle in the affairs of the others (443c-d). The fevered city that was previously described 
have been slowly purified (399e), so that when the time comes to identify justice in the city 
                                                          
8 Burnyeat 1999, 298 
9 Republic 546a-b 
18 
 
it is no longer fevered. The creation of the ideal city has not only been a matter of creating, 
but of purifying. It goes so far in its purification that it remains the city of admiration 
throughout the rest of the dialogue, acquiring the term “fine city” (527c), and in my view 
they are agreeing that they have indeed created the ideal city. What is interesting to note is 
the shift in Socrates attitude towards the city. If he indeed meant that the ideal city would 
be the city he started to outline at the start of his discussion – the “healthy city” – then 
would this city eventually lead to a city along the same lines as the “fine city”? I think that it 
would. For Socrates to locate justice he would need to create a city that would be virtuous, 
such a city is proven to be one along the lines of the city he creates with Glaucon and 
Adeimantus. So I believe that a further inquiry into the “healthy city” would necessarily see 
it evolve into a city that, if not identical to the “fine city”, would at least be very similar to it. 
 
III.2 The faulty constitutions 
 
What makes the philosopher kings the ideal rulers is because they know the Forms 
and as such can truly know what is good, but also of great importance is the fact that they 
will have no wish to rule (520a-b). The primary virtue of the politics of the ideal city is that it 
is ruled by rulers that do not wish to rule, they would rather contemplate the Forms10. Yet 
they will see that it is just that they rule and will perform the task, albeit compulsory (520e-
521a). Indeed Socrates’ hierarchy over governments explained in Book VIII seem to decay 
with each step into a constitution more and more controlled by people who seek power and 
wants to rule. The different forms of government all have their corresponding character-
traits and are ruled by differently controlled people. The best form of government is the 
aristocracy, here the leaders are under the control of reason and as such they are the best 
possible rulers. But because everything must eventually decay civil war will break out at 
some point and a new form of government will arise (546a). This next rule is the timocracy, 
although a form of unjust rule it is ruled by an elite that are internally ruled by the spirited 
                                                          
10 This is one of the main issues when one seek to defend Plato’s theory of justice, it is inconsistent to have to 
force somebody to rule when it is just that they do so, Socrates proclaims from the very beginning of his 
elaboration on justice that justice is always among the finest of goods, both because what comes from it and 
because of itself (358a). So it should not be necessary to force just people to act just, they would want to act 
just in every regard because just acts are accordingly always the best acts. This issue will be dealt with 
consistently throughout this thesis, and “solving the problem of motivation” has the solving of this problem as 
its primary focus. 
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part of their soul, and as such it is the finest of the unjust constitutions (547b-549a). The 
next on the downward-spiralling cycle of governments is the oligarchy. The oligarchs are the 
dominant rulers because of their wealth and they constantly seek to increase their wealth, 
they are ruled by their appetite and with their increase in wealth the difference between the 
rulers and ruled increase till civil war breaks out yet again (549e-555b). This time the people 
will want to avoid a similar rule as the previous so they establish a government where they 
all will be able to contribute, the democracy. The democracy is also ruled by people 
controlled by their appetite, but in a democratic city the appetitive element is undisciplined 
and wild. It leads to mob rule and a constant fear of the oligarchs returning to power (555b-
562a). In this chaotic environment the final and worst of constitutions can arise, the tyranny. 
Because of the state of the political arena a clever demagogue can trick his way into power 
and establish himself as a dictator, and as such the government most ruled by the appetitive 
part comes to fruition. The fully fledged tyrant heeds every base desire of his appetites and 
rules accordingly. It is the constitution furthest from the just rule of the reason-controlled 
aristocrats, and therefore the most unjust way of rule (562a-569c). 
 Socrates blends moral psychology and politics in his descriptions of how different 
governments come into being. The political constitutions are all results of the internal 
relationships in the citizens souls, and not surprisingly the worst government is the one in 
which the ruler has a soul most unlike that of the philosopher-king. It should be clear that 
politics and moral psychology goes hand in hand in the Republic, and to fully understand one 














IV: The Dramaturgical Aspect of the Republic 
 
The research tradition I focus on in this thesis does not to any notable degree deal with the 
fact that the Republic is a dialogue, and as such it contains an aspect of carefully constructed 
dramaturgy. I believe it is a mistake to not take into consideration what Plato tries to convey 
with the dialogue form. The relationships between the characters play into how one must 
understand their conversations with each other.  
 I will in the following passages rely heavy on articles by Drew A. Hyland (1968), Ruby 
Blondell (2002), and, to a lesser extent, points made by Hallvard Fossheim (2008) and 
Michael Frede (1992). 
Hyland writes in his article “Why Plato Wrote Dialogues”: 
 
…one of the clearest points to emerge from a serious consideration of the dialogue form 
is that the “argument” in question cannot be adequately understood without also 
understanding the experience out of which it arises.11 
 
This is a statement I completely agree with, it is all important for a full understanding of any 
subject-matter to explore all relevant sides. In the Republic these sides, in my viewing, 
consist of the moral psychology of whether justice is an inherent good to its owner, 
alongside the aspects of soul; the political aspect which has at its base the utopian society 
created by Socrates and his interlocutors; and the dramaturgical aspect that has at its core 
an understanding of the dialogue-form as well as an understanding of the importance of the 
different characters and what each of these represent. 
 I will in the following passages argue that the reason for Book I ending aporetic is to 
induce thought in the reader and to serve as a sort of introduction to the subject-matter, 
namely justice. Socrates refutes common concepts of justice in Book I in order to make the 
reader think about the nature of justice and to leave him open to the argumentation that 
makes up the remaining dialogue. I will also elaborate on the importance of changing the 
cast of characters that interact with Socrates as he moves from disproving concepts of 
justice to elaborate on his own theory. 
                                                          
11 Hyland , 43 
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 The main reason for including these passages here is to illustrate that I view the 
Republic as an imitation of a real conversation. I will make use of the importance of viewing 
the work as a living conversation rather than a constant thesis when present my own 
solutions at the end of the thesis.12 
 
IV.1 The aporia of Book I 
 
In my reading of the Republic Book I stands clearly apart from the following nine. It lays the 
foundation of what’s to come, by its introduction of the issue that will remain central in the 
rest of the dialogue, but its overall tone and the aim of the participants appear different. In 
Book I Socrates takes on the role as the “refuter”. He refutes the different views on justice 
presented by Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus, but does not offer any solution to 
the issue himself. Socrates as the refuter is not an unusual role for him to inhabit, and he 
does so in several of Plato’s dialogues. The so-called “aporetic” dialogues: Lysis, Charmides, 
Protagoras, Euthyphro, and Theaetetus. Drew A. Hyland argues that these dialogues are 
written in such a way to induce thought in the reader13, they are meant to end without a 
clear answer because the goal is not to persuade the reader into the author’s own views, but 
rather to make him think for himself about the issues that have been discussed. I agree with 
Hyland’s assessment that the aporetic dialogues could be seen as some sort of thought-
provokers in the reader, and that this was one of the goals behind this way of writing. When 
it comes to the dialogues that does not end aporetic I still believe that the goal is to make 
the reader think and consider for himself the different arguments that are being presented. I 
find this to be plausible simply because the dialogue-form has the ability, and Plato 
constantly uses this ability, to present both (or more) sides to an issue with equal 
conviction14. The reader of one of Plato’s dialogues are forced into taking sides in the 
                                                          
12 See: “The defence of justice is not completed until Book IX, this means that the passage that gives life to the 
argument that the philosopher kings act against their own self-interest must be enlightened by the arguments 
that follows up until Book IX” 
13 Hyland (1968), whether Plato wrote for individual readers, groups of listeners/students, or even for the 
purpose of dramatization is not so important here, seeing as the argument I present will play out the same.  
14 Each of the proposed theories from Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus is great examples of this. 
They all appear completely logical until Socrates breaks them down, even after Socrates has had his way 
Glaucon exclaims that he is not satisfied with the answers Socrates has given. The dialogue-form gives Plato the 
tools to portray common understanding in contrast to his particular philosophical understanding, and I see this 
as putting forth views that all boast great believability. It is this aspect of believability that makes the 
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argument. This side does not have to be represented by anyone of the characters in the text, 
it can be the reader’s own thoughts on the matter. So in the non-aporetic dialogues, as well, 
a point can be made for Plato wanting to make the reader think and philosophize about the 
different subjects he writes about. 
 The shift that happens in my reading of the Republic from Book I to Book II is the role 
of Socrates, he goes from refuter to explorer, from disproving theories to laying forth his 
own. I believe that Socrates makes this change as a result of his change in discussion-
partners. Plato makes use of different characters to portray different views, and to move the 
discussion towards the establishment of the ideal state and to locate justice Plato changes 
out the main conversational-partners of Book I to interlocutors that share Socrates’ view 
that justice is superior to injustice (at least they want to share this view). With these 
“likeminded” conversational partners Socrates does not need to fend of attacks on justice, 
he needs to lead an exploration on the true nature of justice. 
To better understand Plato’s views on the written word the Phaedrus will prove to be 
a helpful tool. Socrates offers three distinct arguments meant to illuminate the fact that it is 
better to have live conversations and to remember things than it is to write things down. 
Firstly, the ones who chooses to write down their thoughts will weaken their memory, 
seeing as they exercise it less. Secondly, once something is written down it may fall into the 
hands of people who will misinterpret what is being meant. And thirdly, the written word 
has no way of answering any questions that may arise in the reader, it is reliant on its author 
for support.15 These statements clearly suggests that at least Plato’s Socrates saw little value 
in the written word, but Plato did after all write a great number of dialogues. I think that 
Plato chose to write dialogues because this is the form most similar to a living conversation, 
and as such the form closest to philosophy16. As Hyland points out: “What he [Plato] needed, 
then, was a way which would portray not only the importance of arguments (logoi), but also 
this other aspect, this non-propositional, concrete experience which he felt was 
philosophy.”17 Plato, having found the dialogue the best form possible for his desired 
writing, wrote, as previously mentioned, a number of dialogues that ended aporetic. If Plato 
                                                          
discussions interesting to read, it would be ludicrous to put forth views that could not hope to be taken 
seriously. 
15 Phaedrus 275a-b, 275e, 277e-278a. 
16 See Frede 1992 for a full defence of such a view. 
17 Hyland 1968, 42 
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had as a goal to mimic living conversations with his dialogues, then it is the aporetic 
dialogues that are the ones most interactive with the reader. It gives no clear solution, but 
have instead as a goal to induce thought in the reader.18 Why Plato would then write 
anything other than aporetic dialogues is not clear to me. My best guess is that he must have 
had a different goal than to induce thought in the reader, perhaps he wished to convey his 
theories more convincing, or perhaps he thought that a non-aporetic dialogue could induce 
thought equally good as an aporetic dialogue? The importance is that by leaving a dialogue 
without a clear conclusion he forces the reader to think about the arguments that has been 
made in order for himself to make the conclusion. 
With this in mind the difference between Book I and the remaining nine books of the 
Republic seem even more distinct, and I believe, even more important. Seeing as Book I ends 
in aporetic fashion it may be viewed as a thought-inducer in the reader, Plato wants the 
reader to make up his own thoughts regarding justice before embarking on his own theory. 
So when Glaucon and Adeimantus fully enters as Socrates’ interlocutors in Book II the stage 
is set for Plato to present his own theory to a reader that, hopefully, has started to 
philosophize about the concept of justice himself, and as such is a sort of third19 interlocutor 
in the conversation. 
 
IV.2 The change of interlocutors: from criticism to cooperation 
 
At the very beginning of Book II20 Glaucon takes on the role as questioner, and Socrates is 
put in the position he usually puts his interlocutors in. This speaks to Glaucon’s character as 
a man not satisfied with what has been said about the subject matter so far. He is eager to 
come to the defence of justice, but he needs Socrates in order to do this properly. Along 
with his brother, he proves to be a most efficient interlocutor for Socrates. He is far removed 
from the traditional views portrayed by Cephalus and Polemarchus, and is quite able to 
admit his own errors and learn from them in order to move the argument along. This puts 
Socrates in a position where he will not disprove a thesis, but rather discover in cooperation 
                                                          
18 For a discussion comparing Plato’s views on thinking and the dialogue form see Fossheim 2008. 
19 Counting Socrates as number one and his interlocutor at any given time as number two. 
20 Republic 357a-358e. 
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with his worthy “students”21 the true nature of the subject matter, in this case the true 
nature of justice. The fact that this questioning from Glaucon happens when it does, at the 
very start of Book II, supports a view that the first Book of the Republic is to some extent a 
sort of introduction, but the real search for justice is to come with Glaucon and Adeimantus 
as conversational partners. It is they who have the tools needed to converse with Socrates in 
a productive manner, and they care first and foremost for the truth. The truth for them is 
the truth that they can discover with Socrates as the captain of the discussion, and 
themselves as some sort of second mates who have as their primary responsibility to fail-
check any arguments that may arise within the conversation. The biggest difference, in my 
view, between Socrates’ interlocutors in Book I contra the remaining nine is their willingness 
to learn.  
Ruby Blondell sees the different characters in the Republic as illustrations of different 
levels of philosophical development. Cephalus is a man whose values are painted by 
tradition, Polemarchus takes on his father’s legacy as the elder departs the dialogue, as such 
he harbours the same values, but with the crucial difference that he is open to the critique 
of the conventional concepts that he ascribes to. Polemarchus falls short when it becomes 
clear that he showcases too much passivity, this, however, is something that Thrasymachus 
does not suffer from. He showcases an independence in thinking that is required for the 
higher levels of the guardians education, but he falls short as well, considering he is lacking 
the right opinion inculcated by the earlier stage. As a consequence this makes him “hostile 
and resistant to the fundamental Socratic values that must precede that higher education.”22 
Glaucon and Adeimantus will be shown to be much more appropriate conversational 
partners for Socrates as they don’t suffer from any of the shortcomings of the three previous 
interlocutors.23 I agree with Blondell that one can view the different characters as portraying 
different level of philosophical development, but why she draws a line to the guardians 
education to Glaucon and Adeimantus is a bit unclear to me. It may be that she thinks that 
Socrates, alongside the brothers, believe that they can implement this ideal city and 
                                                          
21 Confer the Apology concerning the fact that Socrates does not consider himself a teacher, yet I see many of 
his interlocutors, in the Republic this is Glaucon and Adeimantus, as some sort of students of Socrates’. Just 
because he himself does not view himself as a teacher, and perhaps this extends to the dialogue-form as well, 
they are nevertheless asking Socrates questions in hope of enlighten their own views, just as a student would a 
teacher. 
22 Blondell 2002, 245 
23 Blondell 2002, 245-246 
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establish such an education, which then in turn would be suited for people equally equipped 
as Glaucon and Adeimantus. I think, however, it is better to view the characters of the 
Republic as pieces meant to move the main argumentation along. Cephalus, Polemarchus, 
and Thrasymachus all serve the purpose of inhabiting usual concepts of justice, and I believe 
they are a part of the dialogue so Socrates can disprove these concepts. When the time 
comes in Book II to show the true nature of justice he needs new interlocutors so that the 
conversation will have a different feel, and in the brothers Socrates has the perfect 
teammates for elaborating on his own view on justice. 
 The brothers are in many ways the ones responsible for consistency and believability 
in Socrates’ argumentation, they are the ones that while apparently harbouring nothing but 
goodwill towards Socrates also won’t let him get away with utterances that has not been 
explained to their satisfaction24. If the following reasoning by Socrates, in cooperation with 
any of these two interlocutors, should prove that any previous statement must be revised or 
rejected, then indeed it is. A perfect example of the brothers as the forces that drives the 
dialogue out of the harbour and on to the open sea yet again is Glaucon’s objection to the 
“city of pigs” (372c-d) that leads to the development of the ideal state. Whenever it is 
unclear to them what Socrates lays forth they have him explain it till they understand, never 
willing to agree to arguments that they don’t believe they have fully understood25. 
 It is also worth noting the several passages where Glaucon shows Socrates that he is 
not a blind follower of his argumentation. He can, if he sees it as necessary, criticize 
Socrates, yet maintain a position of admiration for him, contrasted to Thrasymachus, who 
simply “gives up” (358b). Adding to the idea that Thrasymachus “gave up” (understood as 
giving up on the initial idea he presented that injustice leads to a better life), Glaucon says 
that Thrasymachus was “charmed by you as if he were a snake” (358b). Glaucon is not 
willing to be “charmed”, and this is evident in the remainder of the dialogue, seeing as he, 
alongside his brother, are the ones that refuses to let an unexplained statement slide. 
 Adeimantus takes it upon himself to challenge Socrates with ordinary understanding 
of the subject discussed. Exemplified by the first passage of Book IV where he questions 
Socrates of the happiness of the Guardians. He “interrupts” and asks: “How would you 
                                                          
24 E.g. Republic 427d-c, 449b-451b, 457d-c, 471c-472b, 506b-507a. 
25 E.g. Republic 368d-e, 375a, 377a, 377d, 382a, 392c, 398c, 413b, 438b, 508c, 510b, 523b. Well contrasted to 




defend yourself, Socrates, …if someone told you that you aren’t making these men very 
happy, and that it’s their own fault?” (419). The most important part of this passage is the 
way in which he presents this issue. Adeimantus presents it not as his own critique, rather he 
asks how Socrates would defend himself if someone intervened with this issue, thereby 
removing himself from a position of critique and placing himself as a mere presenter of an 
issue that could arise. The importance is that he remains a collaborator to Socrates, his 
question is not meant as pointing out a fault, it is meant to get Socrates to elaborate in his 
argumentation and deal with an issue that he has discovered, a discovery which he uses to 
help Socrates rather than try to discard his theory. 
 It is clear that it is not only the brothers that view the endeavours of Book II and 
onwards as a project Socrates does not make alone, they help him along the way the best 
they can and Socrates acknowledges this on several accounts. Exemplified by the passage at 
463c: “What about your [Glaucon] guardians?”, and at 443b-c: “Then the dream we had has 
been completely fulfilled – our suspicion that, with the help of some god, we had hit upon 
the origin and pattern of justice right at the beginning in founding our city.” Socrates 
addresses the sons of Ariston in such matters throughout the books that establishes the 
ideal city. He makes them co-founders of the city, and by doing so makes the endeavour a 
joint one, not a project he himself embarks on. 
 Something of great importance of this dramaturgical aspect in the Republic regarding 
Plato’s theory of justice is the way in which the theory can be viewed as a sort of living thing, 
emerging from the initial conversations of Book I and being constantly revised until the end 
of Book IX. It starts with the refutations in Book I, through the first conclusion in Book IV and 
then a revision that comes to an end in Book IX. The importance of seeing the arguments in 
the Republic as evolving will be elaborated on in the sections that aims to solve the problems 
that has been the focus of this text. It should be noted that Socrates does appear to 
elaborate on his own views with conversational partners that are in many ways capable of 
being “proper” conversational partners, if Blondell is correct in her assessment of where the 
different characters is positioned along an imaginary ladder of philosophical development, 
then it opens the possibility of Socrates as a man who “dumbs down” his argumentation 
depending on who he happens to talk to, this in turn leads to the question of whether 
Glaucon and Adeimantus is high enough on the ladder that Socrates has not “dumbed 
down” his argumentation with them, and that this is one of the reasons why it requires quite 
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V: Presentation of the Three Problems 
 
David Sachs wrote an article titled “A Fallacy in Plato's Republic”26 in which he highlights 
what I will refer to as ‘the problem of relevance’. As far as my research has shown the 
research tradition I present in this thesis has its origin with Sachs’ article, and most of the 
articles I present are meant as direct answers to Sachs’ proposed fallacy. During the 
evolution of argumentation in Plato’s defence however, it appears that upon reaching a 
satisfying defence against Sachs there are more issues that needs to be addressed. So the 
three problems I have identified all have as their origin Sachs’ article, but I believe that 
Sachs’ thinks that his proposed fallacy is of such magnitude that any other problems the 
theory may have becomes equally irrelevant because of Socrates’ inability to praise and 
defend justice on the same grounds as he was tasked. The two issues apart from the 
problem of motivation, slowly becomes a part of the research tradition, but as I will show in 
the following walkthrough of this tradition the primary focus is to defend against Sachs, and 
the other issues I focus on are mentioned quite often as inconveniences or possible 
difficulties, but they are rarely acknowledged (at least in articles in the first decades Sachs’ 
issue is discussed). 
Sachs focuses on what Socrates is actually tasked with defending, and what he 
actually ends up defending, and Sachs concludes that these do not correspond. Out of this 
focus on what the actual challenge to Socrates consists of I think it is not only necessary to 
show that Socrates answer the challenge on the same ground as he was asked – i.e. that 
there is no shift in the understanding of justice among the interlocutors – but that it will also 
be necessary to answer two more issues. Socrates is places justice “among the finest goods, 
to be valued by anyone who is going to be blessed with happiness, both because of itself and 
because of what comes from it” (358a, my italics). We can already identify that Socrates, 
before he has elaborated at all about his own definition, sees justice as having two primary 
benefits: that which comes from justice itself, and that which comes from the consequences 
from justice. As I shall show in my passage about Sachs’ article (first article in chapter VI), the 
first problem will be to show that Socrates answers the challenge in the same manner as it 
was asked. If one cannot show that Socrates remains consistent in regards to his challenge it 
                                                          
26 Sachs 1963 
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leaves not only the problem of relevance irrelevant, but the entirety of what Socrates says 
about justice irrelevant.  If one is successful in showing that Socrates indeed answer his 
challenge satisfactory, one will need to clarify the inconsistency that happens when Socrates 
proclaims that the philosopher kings must be forced to rule (520a-b). Having already 
proclaimed that justice is to be sought after not only for what comes from it but also from 
itself the just philosopher kings would surely jump to the opportunity to act just and to 
perform justice in the physical world. So the problem of motivation is concerned with 
defending why and how it is always in a person’s best self-interest to act justly.  
The third challenge I propose to defend also springs from the problem of relevance. 
Glaucon and Adeimantus want to know why they should act justly, and why they should seek 
to be just, and Socrates’ utterance that justice is “to be valued by anyone who is going to be 
blessed with happiness” indicate that justice is something everyone should strive for, but by 
Socrates own accord the happiest and best of lives are the ones that are being lived by the 
philosopher kings (587b), and it appears that it is only them that can be just. The challenge is 
to show that justice indeed is available to all so that everyone can aspire to be just, if not 
then Socrates has only managed to show that justice exists, but if it is only attainable by a 
few in a very precise setting, it follows that no one should seek to act justly because justice is 
(roughly) unattainable. The problem of possibility seeks to show that justice in fact is 
available to all. 
 
V.1 Short definitions of the different problems 
 
Problem I: The problem of relevance: The problem arises with Sachs’ article and deals with 
Socrates definition and defence of justice, which Sachs claims does not answer what had 
been asked. According to Sachs the concept of justice Socrates is tasked with defending, and 
the very same concept Socrates places “among the finest goods” (358a) is in fact not the 
concept he eventually defends. The concept Socrates defends is justice understood as a 
state in one’s soul where each of the parts does, and keeps, to its own, a concept Sachs 
refers to as Platonic justice. What Socrates is tasked with defending is the sort of justice 
Socrates discusses with Thrasymachus, which according to Sachs is a concept of justice that 
springs out from common conceptions of right and wrong, i.e. not linked to the abstract 
concept of soul harmony, Sachs calls this concept vulgar justice. To answer the problem of 
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irrelevance one must show that there exists a link between platonic justice and vulgar justice 
that justifies Socrates defence of justice, or one must disprove Sachs’ claim that the basis for 
Socrates’ defence is laid on the foundation of vulgar justice. 
 
Problem II: The problem of motivation: This issue revolves around the fact that one will 
need to give a sufficient answer to the apparent contradiction that the philosopher is acting 
out of self-interest when he is forced to rule (520a-b). To answer this question one must give 
sufficient evidence that justice is always in one’s own best interest. It is best illustrated by 
showing that it will be in the philosopher kings best interest to rule because this is the 
hardest example to reconcile with previous statements about justice in the dialogue. 
 
Problem III: The problem of possibility: Socrates holds that it is in everyone’s best self-
interest to act justly, but primarily in the dialogue he discusses the philosopher kings. This 
raises the question of whether or not platonic justice is available to everyone. If it is not 
available to everyone, in one form or another, then it is impossible for these people to act in 
accordance to how Plato thinks everyone ought to act. A theory that aims to defend Plato’s 


















VI: Overview of the Research-Tradition Regarding the Problems in Plato’s Theory 
of Justice in the Republic 
 
In the following passages I will analyse chronologically the research tradition that started 
with Sachs’ article in 1963. I will present each article with a focus on their original 
contribution to the debate, and I will investigate how each article deals with the three 
problems I have presented. It is important to note here that I have chosen to present the 
articles chronologically so it will be visible how the debate has evolved and where and how 
different approaches come into the debate.  When answering the challenge prompted by 
Sachs most scholars leave themselves open to other difficulties that in turn leads other 
commentators to seek other solutions, or they may just present alternative views without 
explicitly proving a previous theory right or wrong. The different problems I have identified 
are by different scholars called different things, and the majority of the articles I focus on 
take no notice of the problem of possibility. Those that do mention the issue seldom offer 
any solution to it.27 
 Most of the articles seek to show that Sachs’ fallacy does not exist, and in addition 
they want to solve the apparent contradiction of the problem of motivation. 
 The articles are presented chronologically, but I will on occasion use criticism by a 
newer article on a previous one to help bring out weaknesses in the article. 
 
VI.1 Sachs, David, “A Fallacy in Plato's Republic” (1963) 
 
Sachs’ article is meant as an illustration of the problem of relevance, he does not seek to 
defend Plato in his article, rather he wants to highlight what he believes is a fatal flaw in the 
work. 
Sachs operates with two conceptions of justice: ‘vulgar justice’, and ‘platonic justice’. 
Vulgar justice is the conception of justice that Sachs claims is shared by all the interlocutors 
                                                          
27 Rachel Singpurwalla (2006) brings it up as a possible weakness in her theory that she perhaps could not show 




at the beginning of Book I of the Republic28, a conception that can be summed up with the 
phrase: “every man his due”. Platonic justice is the conception Socrates lays forth over the 
course of Book II-IV, in which justice is understood as harmony in one’s soul where each of 
its parts partakes in nothing but its own. What Sachs proposes as a Fallacy in the Republic is 
that when Socrates turns this common justice29 into platonic justice he still has to show that 
this form of justice would include that the man inhabiting this would also be just in the 
vulgar sense. He argues that in order to “bear successfully against Thrasymachus’ 
contentions and satisfy Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ demands of Socrates”30 Plato needs to 
prove that the platonically just man also conforms to the ordinary canons of justice, as well 
as proving that his conception of justice is exemplified by “every man who is just according 
to the vulgar conception”.31 As Sachs concludes at the end of his paper: 
 
Had Plato succeeded in showing that the happiest or most blessed of men are those 
who are just according to his conception of justice, and that the farther a man is from 
exemplifying Platonic justice the more unhappy he will be, Plato still would not have 
shown either that Platonic justice entails vulgar justice or the converse. That is, he 
would still have to relate his conclusions to the controversy which, plainly, they are 
intended to settle.32 
 
To build this bridge between platonic and vulgar justice Sachs claims that Plato must show: 
(1) that the platonic just man will not be vulgarly unjust; and (2) that a vulgar just man will 
also be a platonic just man.33 Sachs claims that Socrates, in regards to the first of these 
propositions, never attempts to demonstrate its truth, but merely assert it as truth.34 In 
regards to the second proposition Sachs claims that Plato is unaware, he goes as far as to 
argue that Plato did not believe it to be true35, and that it in fact is ground to suppose that it 
                                                          
28 When I lay forth my own theory in chapter VIII I discuss the possibility that there in fact exists a notion of 
justice in the dialogue as something more than “every man his due” before Socrates introduces it, effectively 
rendering Sachs fallacy irrelevant. 
29 For the remainder of this paper I use vulgar justice and common justice as different terms for the same thing. 
30 Sachs 1963, 153 
31 Sachs 1963, 153 
32 Sachs 1963, 157 
33 Sachs 1963, 152-153 
34 Sachs 1963, 154 
35 Sachs 1963, 156 
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is not even plausible36. With this as the chain of argumentation Plato’s claim that the 
platonically just man is the happiest man misses its mark. It does not show us the necessary 
requirements for the bridge between vulgar justice and platonic justice, and as such the 
grandiose attempt to satisfy the demands made by Glaucon and Adeimantus suffer from a 
fatal flaw of irrelevance. 
Sachs ultimately finds Plato’s arguments to be insufficient. He sees the points being 
made by Socrates, but makes the observation that he merely explains how a just man will 
act, and how he does not, and that he lacks a foundation for explaining why. The main 
problem for Sachs, in addition to his claim that there is no bridge between platonic and 
vulgar justice, appears to be the problem of motivation, i.e. there appears to be no clear 
reason for why one should act justly.  
Sachs is not defending Plato in his paper37 he is shining a light on issues he thinks are 
ignored by his contemporary commentators. So there is no solution to either the problem of 
relevance, the problem of motivation, or the problem of possibility taken into consideration 
in any way in his paper. 
 
VI.2 Demos, Raphael, “A Fallacy in Plato's Republic?” (1964) 
 
Raphael Demo´s defence for Plato’s theory highlights a possible bridge between platonic and 
vulgar justice, in addition his article does offer a solution for the problem of motivation. 
Demos claims that Sachs is wrong in his assumption that Plato does not offer any link 
between Platonic and vulgar justice. Sachs’ main point is that Plato offers no proof for his 
statement that the platonically just man will be the least likely to commit acts commonly 
perceived as unjust. To this Demos agrees, there does exist a gap between platonic and 
vulgar justice, but he does not agree that there exists a fallacy. Plato’s theory suffers merely 
from not being fully described. One only needs to view the description Plato starts and from 
there draw logical conclusions based on these descriptions. This line of thought leads Demos 
to point out his link between platonic and vulgar justice: 
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…each soul cares for its own health just as the body does. …The health of the soul 
includes, above all, the fulfillment of its reason: and the concern of reason is that the 
good should be exemplified everywhere. The concern for my self-fulfillment is 
analyzable into a concern that everyone should attain psychical fulfillment; that I am 
inwardly just means that I want everyone to have his due.38 
 
The individual with a just soul sees his own good realized by wanting good for others. This 
theory is based on the nature of the Forms and the assumption that when reason rules the 
soul, and proper insight into the Forms has been reached, one would see that the right thing 
is for everyone to have his due. This solves the problem of relevance by showing that the link 
between platonic and vulgar justice is the concern that everyone should have his own, which 
leads the just individual to refrain from commonly understood unjust acts because these 
actions are not compatible with the realization that everyone should have their due.  
The problem of motivation is solved, though only partially. The motivation for the 
philosopher kings for wanting to rule is that they want everyone to have their due, and for 
this to become reality they must rule. Demos does not, however, offer an explanation for 
why they need to be forced to rule (520a-b). If they are just they would want everyone to 
have his due, and by this logic they should want to rule. Socrates’ point about the 
philosopher kings being the ones that least of all would want to rule is not explained by this 
theory. 
The problem of possibility39 is also not answered in any meaningful way in Demos’ 
article. The fact that if one is just one would want everyone to have his due does not offer 
anything in regards to who in fact can inhabit this view. Although it appears that the theory 
bases itself on justice being acquired through the Forms it is most likely a theory based 
around the conception that only the philosopher kings can be truly just. 
 
VI.3 Vlastos, Gregory, “Justice and Happiness in the Republic” (1973) 
  
Gregory Vlastos proposes that Plato holds the following two theses: 
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Thesis I: There is a condition of soul – “psychic harmony,” I shall call it – which is in and 
of itself a greater good to one who has it than would be any he could secure at the cost 
of the contrary condition of the soul. 
Thesis II: One has psychic harmony iff40 one has a firm and stable disposition to act justly 
towards others.41 
 
The first thesis is commonly agreed upon by most commentators, and requires little 
elaboration. Thesis II is Vlastos’ contribution to the ongoing debate of how to best 
understand (and how to best defend) Plato’s theory in the Republic, and this requires a bit of 
elaboration. Vlastos’ focus is primarily on the language used by Plato, he points out that 
when first defining justice in the polis Socrates says: “This then, my friend, if taken in a 
certain way, appear to be justice: to do one’s own.”42 The importance of this passage comes 
from Vlastos’ interpretation of Plato’s use of “if taken in a certain way”43. Vlastos sees this as 
an indication that justice is not simply about everyone minding their own business and 
keeping to themselves, but that everyone on an individual level sees their work as part of a 
whole, and that “doing their own” really indicates a mindfulness of how their work “will best 
mesh with that of others to their joint benefit.”44. “Their joint benefit” is their cooperation 
towards the functionality of the polis, the primary goal of “doing one’s own” is then by 
Vlastos understood as how to best fulfil a purpose within the polis that will lead to the 
greatest and best functionality of the polis.  
He further seeks to elaborate his theory by relying on how Socrates says his theory will 
play out in regards to judicial justice: 
 
And won’t their sole aim in delivering judgements be that no citizen should have what 
belongs to another or be deprived what is his own? 
 They’ll have no aim but that. 
                                                          
40 If and only if 
41 Vlastos 1973, 113-114 
42 Vlastos 1973, 118, quoting the Republic 433A-B. Unknown which translation he uses, I guess either his own 
or Paul Shoreys, seeing as he mentions Shorey’s translation quite often in his footnotes. 
43 In the translation I use (Cooper, M, John (ed.), Plato – Complete Works. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 
1997. The Republic is translated by G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve), the passage goes: ”Then, it turns out that 
this doing one’s own work – provided that it comes to be in a certain way – is justice.” (433b) 
44 Vlastos 1973, 118 
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 Because that is just? 
 Yes. 
 Therefore, from this point of view also, the having and doing of one’s own would be 
accepted as justice.45 
 
This passage illustrates that justice is measurable by the guardians in the ideal city. Vlastos 
believes that with examples like these Plato shows that the idea of justice as “doing and 
having one’s own” is directly linked with the common conception of justice. In Vlastos’ view 
Plato means “that in any community in which everyone lived up to the maxim, “do your 
own,” there would be no [pleonexia46]”, i.e. in Kallipolis nobody would seek to better their 
own situation by stealing or in any way wronging others.  
 Vlastos sees Plato’s theory as a two-part theory, one “social” part and one 
“psychological” part, where the social theory is based on what Socrates says about justice in 
the city, and the psychological theory is based on what Socrates says about justice in the 
soul. The same principle rules both theories, namely “doing and having one’s own”.47  
To further give any credence to his thesis, Vlastos makes the claim that every 
situation involving some sort of social conduct in the ideal state falls under the scope of 
justice understood as “doing one’s own”. In order to back up this statement Vlastos points to 
three concrete passages in the Republic: 
 
(i) The formulae [justice understood as “doing one’s own] is applied even to slaves who, 
not being citizens, could hardly be thought of as having civic duties; also to children, 
who as yet have no civic duties (433D2-3). 
(ii) Things people do in private contexts – the play of children, the respect shown the old 
by the young, the clothes and shoes people wear, even haircuts – have the gravest 
consequences for the whole of society (424A ff.); thus if children play “lawless” games, 
the “laws and the constitution” will be affected and eventually “everything, private and 
public, will be overturned” (424D-E). 
                                                          
45 Republic 433e-434a.  
46 I understand the word to mean something on the lines of “wanting what belong to others”. 
47 Vlastos 1973, 123 
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(iii) If the scope of the “doing one’s own” formula were not broad enough to cover 
refraining from all kinds of [pleonexia], public or private, the biconditional, “each shall 
have his own iff each does his own,” would fail.48 
 
These observations lead Vlastos to assume that in every part of social conduct, performed in 
the ideal state, the formula of “doing one’s own” comes in to play. “Doing one’s own” 
applies then, in Vlastos’ reading, to every aspect of social justice, as well as to the 
psychological part of justice. The importance is that Vlastos holds that Plato required for a 
man to be just that the whole of him was just, i.e. that the just man does not only have a 
rightly ordered soul, but that he also is fulfilling his appropriate part in the polis.  
 Vlastos answers Sachs’ accusation of a fallacy by explaining that Plato holds that 
justice must be understood as a whole that includes not only what Sachs referred to as 
“platonic justice”, but that it also has a social aspect. This leads to the conclusion that the 
“shift” that Sachs points out does not happen, the social aspect of justice is directly linked to 
actions as it deals with each person’s best contribution to the polis (which I read to mean 
will happen through each person’s actions within the polis). What Vlastos does not answer is 
whether or not this theory of justice is applicable to anything outside the Kallipolis. If it is not 
then Socrates would still suffer from a problem of Relevance: just as “Platonic justice” is 
removed from the common understanding of justice, so is common justice in an 
unobtainable location, they have no real link to answering why men like Glaucon and 
Adeimantus should aspire to be just, and why it pays more in every aspect to be just rather 
than unjust. 
 The problem of motivation is not given a proper answer by Vlastos, it is not enough 
to merely hold that people live in accordance with “doing one’s own”, it must be shown why 
this pays in itself. If it does not pay in itself then why should people “do their own”, just 
because something is just it does not equal a motivation for acting just. If the end goal is all 
that matters –  and for Vlastos that is the importance of doing one’s own, the importance is 
to fulfil a role in the polis – then people would seek to do as little as possible to reach the 
end goal. A person would seek out how to avoid doing more than he absolutely has to, his 
only concern is to have a just disposition towards others and to fulfil his role in the polis, but 
he has no reason for wanting this besides his knowledge that it is just. Unless Vlastos thinks 
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that it is motivating to want to act justly towards others, and in order to act justly towards 
others one must act justly in every situation. I think this is troublesome as well, is it for 
example an act of injustice towards others to lie to spare them suffering? Or to steal from 
someone something that might harm them? According to Socrates the philosopher king is 
the man least likely to commit such acts as stealing (although it is considered just that they 
lie about certain things to the general public). The conclusion must be that Vlastos does not 
deal with this issue concretely enough to say he has successfully answered the problem. 
 The problem of possibility49 appears to be answered, at least indirectly. Vlastos thinks 
a vital part of justice is to fulfil one’s appropriate role in the polis, and this is something that 
all the classes of the Kallipolis can achieve. However, his two main theses say nothing of who 
it attains to, it can easily be viewed as attributes only achievable by the philosopher kings. 
Therefore, Vlastos’ article does not give a proper concrete answer to the problem of 
possibility. 
 
VI.4 Kraut, Richard, “Reason and justice in Plato's Republic” (1973) 
 
Kraut50 seek to answer the problem of relevance found in the Republic by focusing on what 
the just person would necessarily strive for, what he would love, and what he would 
consider worthwhile: 
 
…the goals associated with reason are more worth pursuing than the goals associated 
with spirit or appetite. It is better to love an activity that develops our talents, cultivates 
our reason, and subordinates to the mind our passions, appetites, and body, than it is to 
love domination over others, or to love prestige, wealth, or sensuality.51 
 
The just man will have no motivation at all for acting unjustly in the vulgar sense. The reason 
for why Socrates is right in his conclusion that the just man will refrain from such acts is by 
                                                          
49 It is noteworthy that many of the commentators propose solutions that will to a great extent also solve the 
problem of possibility, but this fact is usually something that follows from the main objective, not a goal in 
itself. 
50 Richard Kraut is a commentator that shows up with two articles on this list, the main reason for this is the 
difference in his articles, as will be shown each article has different merits that come into play in my own 
solutions to the problems. 
51 Kraut 1973, 222 
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Kraut explained by the goals at which the just man aims. Being ruled by Reason his goals, 
and his motivation, will be aimed at the sort of goals associated with Reason, these goals 
does not coincide with actions that are perceived as commonly or vulgarly unjust. Illustrated 
by the passage in the Republic: “Now, we surely know that, when someone’s desires incline 
strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened by others, just like a stream that has been 
partly diverted into another channel.” (485d) Plato goes on to argue that for the philosopher 
this would result in abandonment of bodily pleasures, because his desires “flow towards 
learning and everything of that sort”. (485d-e) For Kraut this passage from Plato is the key 
argument for why the platonically just man will not act vulgarly unjust, he (at least the just 
philosopher) will have no incentive to act vulgarly unjust, it will in fact go against his desires 
as a man seeking intellectual goals.52  
This line of argumentation does answer why the platonically just man will act vulgarly 
just, but it does not answer it in a satisfactory way. Kraut’s theory does not show the 
motivation behind the just man wanting to act vulgarly just, it simply shows that he will have 
no motivation for acting vulgarly unjust. This critique is based on the fact that Socrates holds 
that justice is something worth inhabiting for itself and what comes from it, I (as well as 
other commentators53) take it that Plato implies that acting justly requires some form of 
wish for acting justly, and by removing this wish for acting justly and replacing it with a set of 
desires that have no motive for acting unjustly Kraut does not succeed in answering Sachs’ 
proposed fallacy. 
Justin Gosling54 offers a great example for why it is not sufficient to show that there 
exists no motivation for acting unjustly, but that one actually needs to display that Plato 
holds that there exists motivation for acting justly: 
 
…Suppose a philosopher with an impediment of speech which does not interfere with 
his philosophizing, but does render him unfit for any public office, suppose also, that he 
knows it to be curable. All he has to do to retain his academic privileges is to keep this 
knowledge to himself. No lie is required, no strife or scandal in the state is caused, so his 
                                                          
52 Kraut 1973, page 214. 
53 Most notably Annas (1981) and Singpurwalla (2006) 
54 Gosling 2010 
40 
 
own soul will not be damaged, nor his life in the state endangered. So what possible 
reason could there be for him to reveal his knowledge and accept his responsibilities?55 
 
Through the use of such hypothetical scenarios it is easy to see how the philosopher can act 
according to Krauts defence but still be in situations where he most likely would act in 
disagreement with what is proclaimed in the Republic as just, in this case that it is just that 
the philosophers rule the city. So a defence of Plato requires a proper theory of motivation. 
Kraut does offer some interesting views on the problem of possibility: 
 
When a person is punished “the part that is full of wild beasts is calmed and tamed, 
while the tamed part is freed” (519B2-3), so that the individual becomes just. If the 
craftsman is necessarily ruled by appetite, then punishment would be wasted on him. 
And Plato holds that those who cannot be cured by punishment should be put to death 
(410A). It follows that he thought the citizens of the economic class for the most part 
curable, that is, capable of having just souls.56 
 
This idea is transferrable to the Auxiliaries as well, if one is to be put to death if one is 
incurable, i.e. incapable of having a just soul, then it appears that everyone that exists within 
the Auxiliary class, as well as the Guardian- and Producer-class, is capable of having a just 
soul. Kraut is careful to use the word “capable”, he does not go as far as saying everyone will 
have a just soul, and rightfully so in my opinion. Socrates proposes that it is the individuals 
“whose bodies are naturally unhealthy or whose souls are incurably evil” (410a) that are to 
be put to death, so what is being concluded here is that it is merely those who prove 
themselves as being utterly incurable that will be discarded. This approach does not tell us 
whether or not people that are “curable” will be “cured”, if they already are “cured”, or if 
they simply have the capability to be “cured”. It is still up for debate who is just in the ideal 
city, and indeed if platonic justice is only available in the ideal city. 
 Kraut explores the idea that “the love of one’s craft is the artisan’s analogue to the 
philosopher’s love of wisdom?”57. As a way to further prove that justice is available to all the 
classes of the ideal city (still no proof whether justice is available anywhere else) Kraut offers 
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the theory that the rational, just artisan will love his work in the same way as the 
philosopher kings will love wisdom58. The importance of this fact is that it coincides with 
Krauts theory that no motivation for injustice is sufficient defence for platonic justice 
containing vulgar justice: “To show that the craftsman ruled by reason will act justly, Plato 
would argue that under normal conditions the artisan has no motive for unjust behaviour. 
Like the philosopher, his energies are absorbed by his love for a kind of wisdom.”59 Kraut 
does here show that his theory leads all the individuals in the ideal city to become just, but 
as illustrated by Gosling this theory has its flaws. Julia Annas with her article “Plato and 
Common Morality”60  points out another flaw in the theory presented by Kraut. Kraut writes 
that “the natural distribution of various talents within the polis meets the basic economic 
need of the polis …One person’s pursuit of the goal does not interfere with another’s, so 
there is no temptation to deprive another of what is his”61. This is a point that solves a 
problem Kraut himself mentions in a footnote: “[Plato] cannot simply rely on the premise 
that philosophers prefer intellectual goals to all others, because this preference is 
compatible with a philosopher’s stealing money when doing so requires no sacrifice in his 
pursuit of intellectual goals.”62 Annas commentary focuses on the fact that Kraut commits an 
even worse fallacy than the one Sachs claims Plato commits by trying to solve this problem 
the way he does: “…by the time we have stipulated that conditions are such that there is no 
competition in the way people attain their differing goals, we have got rid of what was 
worrying Thrasymachus even without any doctrine of Platonic justice.”63 Thrasymachus says 
that unjust actions are tempting because of what people want are in limited supply, and that 
people are always in competition for them64, a statement which makes it impossible to act 
just. When Kraut removes this problem one can argue, as Annas does, that there exists an 
even worse fallacy than the one pointed out by Sachs. Any theory designed to defend Plato 
must contain an answer to Thrasymachus on his own terms, if it does not it has not 
disproven the existence of a fallacy.  
                                                          
58 I interpret this “love of wisdom” as a love of the Forms, and to include all the intellectual endeavours that the 
Guardians hold higher than all else. 
59 Kraut 1973, 222 
60 Annas 1978 
61 Kraut 1973, 224 
62 Kraut 1973, Footnote 10, page 214, he credits William Morris and Ian Mueller for this point. 
63 Annas 1978, 441 
64 Thrasymachus speech in Book I (343b-344c) sees Thrasymachus proclaiming that the unjust man will always 
gain more than the just man in every circumstance when the two are compared.  
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VI.5 Cooper, M, John, “The Psychology of Justice in Plato” (1977(1999)) 
 
Cooper65 answers Sachs’ claim by showing how Plato’s focus on the Forms are to be properly 
understood. The philosopher that has knowledge of the Forms will because he has reached 
this state of knowledge want to replicate what he has seen in the Forms in the physical 
world. By acting in accordance with the Forms the philosopher is not capable to act unjustly 
seeing as he has knowledge of true justice and will always act in accordance with it. 
 Almost by default then it is only the philosopher’s that can hope to ever be truly just: 
 
This knowledge [of the good-itself, an image of the collective Forms] is obviously not 
easily won, and if justice requires having it, and only a studious sort of person, who cares 
relatively little for other pursuits in comparison with intellectual ones, can achieve it, 
then no one can be just who is not that kind of studious person.66 
 
The weakness of his theory is the lack of a solution to the problem of motivation, illustrated 
by the example where the philosopher kings give up their self-interest by choosing to rule. 
Cooper answers this critique in the following way: 
 
…a just person is a devotee of the good, not his own good; and these are very different 
things. Knowing the good, what he wants is to advance the reign of rational order in the 
world as a whole, so far as by his own efforts, alone or together with others, he can do 
this. He recognizes a single criterion of choice: What, given the circumstances, will be 
most likely to maximize the total amount of rational order in the world as a whole?67 
 
He later adds to this view: 
 
His ultimate end is to improve not just the small part of the world that is constituted by 
his own life, but the whole of it, this part taken together with all the rest. So if a 
philosopher opted, under the conditions Plato envisages, to ignore everyone else in 
                                                          
65 This version is a reprint of the original article that was released in American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 14, 
No. 2, in 1977, hence it’s placement in this chronological walkthrough of the research tradition regarding 
Plato’s theory of justice in the Republic. 
66 Cooper 1999, 145 
67 Cooper 1999, 145 
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order to make his own life realize the good more perfectly and fully, he would fail to 
achieve the goal he was aiming at as nearly as he might have done. And if the degree of 
one's eudaimonia is measured by how close one comes to realizing one's ultimate end, 
such a philosopher would be less eudaimon than he would have been by living the mixed 
political and intellectual life Socrates and his interlocutors were urging. And if one 
further supposes, as Plato certainly does, that human nature is such that left to 
themselves most people would always lead very disordered lives, it seems fair to say 
that any philosopher who ever opts for the mixed life will actually be more eudaimon 
than any who opts for the purely intellectual life : any philosopher would always prefer 
the mixed life, and he would recognize any situation in which it was rational for him to 
choose a life of pure contemplation instead as one where external conditions alone, by 
preventing his efforts on others' behalf from bearing fruit, forced him to settle for less 
than he had wished to achieve on behalf of the good-itself.68 
 
Cooper does in many ways remove self-interest from the equation, with claims that the 
philosopher is selfless, and the only thing that matters is the whole. The individual suddenly 
has no clear individual purpose, he only has a place in the whole. The argumentation here is 
based on the philosopher’s dedication on the Forms, and in Cooper’s view the Forms has no 
place for individual wishes. The absolute highest happiness and harmony for the city, and in 
turn for all the souls in the city, can only come to pass when one acts in accordance with the 
Forms. Even if self-interest is not a focus, it is still saved with regards that it is first and 
foremost in one’s self-interest to act in accordance with the Forms, so as to reach and 
maintain maximum happiness. 
 Cooper answers the problem of relevance with his claim that the philosopher 
replicates the Forms and his insight into the Form of justice makes him unable to perform 
unjust acts, the platonically just man is therefore vulgarly just. This view has its obvious 
weakness in the fact that it appears the philosopher no longer chooses to act justly, he 
simply does it because of his knowledge, a knowledge that makes him unable to act unjustly, 
there is no longer any incentive for acting justly. Instead of being a man that chooses to act 
justly, rather than unjustly, he has become a sort of drone on behalf of the Forms that can 
only act in a certain way. Cooper can be defended by interpreting him to mean that the 
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philosopher kings will merely want to bring about the Forms in the physical world, and that 
they will strive towards this goal as best as they can, and that every choice they make in 
regards to morality and justice have the potential to clash between acting justly and bringing 
the Forms about in the physical world. By acting in accordance with the Form of justice the 
philosopher kings are bringing the Forms into the physical world, but let’s say that they see a 
shortcut to bringing about harmony and order to the city, and this “shortcut” requires that 
they act unjustly towards an individual or group in the city, the philosopher kings will in 
Cooper’s view perform the unjust acts in order to mimic the Forms more closely because the 
city will resemble the Forms more closely as a result of their actions. The point is that there 
exist scenarios where the philosophers will act unjustly because it is not their first concern 
that they act justly. Where Kraut pointed out a lack of motivation for acting unjustly, Cooper 
holds that insight into the Forms is the motivation. This motivation however is a motivation 
for mimicking and acting in accordance with what they have learned and seen while 
contemplating the Forms, as a result their motivation is not to act justly, but to mimic the 
Forms to the best of their abilities. This can lead to a philosopher king acting unjustly while 
still being rightly motivated, there exists no guarantee that the Guardians would not act 
unjustly if it would lead to a society more closely structured to the structure of the Forms. 
Cooper does as a result not answer the problem of motivation. 
 The problem of possibility remains, seeing as Cooper relies on the Forms to explain 
how the platonically just man will act vulgarly just when all those that lack insight into the 
Forms cannot acquire this knowledge, and therefore cannot become just. Only the guardians 
can become just because it is only they who can reach the Forms. 
 
VI.6 Annas, Julia, “The Defense of Justice” & “Understanding and the Good: Sun, Line, and Cave” 
(1981) 
 
Annas claims that Plato moves from a question regarding a theory of justice based in an act-
theory69, to a more refined theory of justice based in an agent-theory70. Platonic justice will 
in this light not answer the question fronted by Thrasymachus in the same manner as it is 
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asked, because the focus for Plato’s concept of justice is based on the agent, rather than the 
act.71 
 
…because Plato shifts from an act-centred to an agent-centred concept of justice, we 
cannot expect anything like an entailment between the two notions. We have to reject 
the idea that Socrates is either answering Thrasymachus in the latter's own terms, or 
changing the subject entirely. Rather, he wants to retain what he takes to be the central 
beliefs about justice and alter only the peripheral beliefs and the ones he takes to be 
false or misleading.72 
 
Annas maintains that “there are two respects in which ordinary justice plays a role in 
constraining the account of Platonic justice”: 
 
Firstly, Plato claims, emphatically, that the condition of having a just soul is created, 
fostered, and maintained by the doing of just actions - see 485d ff., 443d-444e, and 
588e-59 1 e. The analogue here is health: as healthy actions produce health, so doing 
just actions produces justice, and doing unjust actions produces injustice. …Secondly, 
Plato does appeal at the end of Book 4 to 'commonplace' judgements of what is 
ordinarily just, and claim that Platonic justice will meet them (442d-e). So he does think 
that ordinary justice constrains the con ten t of Platonic justice.73 
 
She does highlight that these common conceptions of justice are limited to “clear-cut cases 
of what the just person will never do.”74 So if these passages are to be read as a bridge 
between ordinary justice and Platonic justice, it will be a most unstable bridge, a bridge open 
to the same critique as Sachs puts forth75. 
She also highlights some of the more challenging passages of the Republic: 
 
We have already seen one respect in which Platonic justice will revise our ideas about 
which actions are just: the Guardians' attitude to truth. We can see clearly from this that 
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although Plato thinks that consensus about just actions shows that the ideally good 
person would never steal or commit adultery, he does not think that it shows that he or 
she would always tell the truth. The importance of truth in the Guardians' upbringing 
has been stressed. To be deceived is terrible; God hates falsehood and loves truth 
(382e). Later passages stress at length the Guardians' almost fanatical devotion to truth: 
485c-d and 49oa-d describe raptly how their souls will strive tirelessly for communion 
with what is true. And yet we have seen that they lie to the other citizens quite 
straightforwardly (see pp. 107-8, and 459c-46oa). 389b-d states explicitly that the 
Guardians may lie to the others in their interests although it would be wrong for the 
others to lie to them. But there is not meant to be a contrast here; rather, it is because 
they are so keen on the truth, because they have natures that love it, that they can lie 
on occasion - for then it would be the right thing to do in the light of the whole of the 
truth.76 
 
Annas focus is on what appears to be contradictory approaches in the Guardian’s 
relationship to the truth, on the one hand they understand that “to be deceived is terrible”, 
yet they themselves are allowed to deceive the members of the other classes. With this in 
mind it is difficult to explain that everyone has a reason, in every circumstance, and for its 
own sake, to act justly. The Guardians may lie on occasion to members of the other classes, 
even if this is right to do in light of the whole of the truth, it would follow that the members 
of the other classes at best can be measured as indirectly just, if they follow the lies that are 
being told them and by doing so act justly, although the full reason for why it is just would 
elude them. It may also be that it only is the Guardians that can be fully just, and that the 
other classes simply cannot be just, and to keep the city and the Guardians just, the 
Guardians sometimes have to lie. “…being just turns out to require being a philosopher.”77 
 
The Sun begins with a wholesale contrast between objects of thought and objects of 
perception (507b); the Line suggests that different cognitive states are correlated with 
different objects; and the philosopher emerges from the Cave into another world, 
leaving the original environment behind.78 
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The philosopher transcends from this world and into the world of the Forms, leaving this 
world behind says Annas, but he does also return. He returns to spread the truth of what he 
has seen. In the perfect just city these speeches would be taken to heart by all the 
inhabitants and they would live accordingly, and it would be just for them to do so, even if 
what the philosopher had seen was so perplexing and incomprehensible, that he had to 
cloud the truth behind a veil of noble lies to make the members of the other classes 
understand the message he was conveying.  
 
Plato sometimes talks of Forms as though what characterized them was changelessness 
(p. 223), and in Sun, Line, and Cave talks as though there were something inherently 
defective about the whole world of experienced particulars just as such. And in Book 10 
(admittedly an odd production as a whole) he brings in Forms in a way guaranteed to 
cause conflict with the accounts in Books 5 and 7. This means, unfortunately, that we 
cannot rely on what is claimed about Forms to settle the question, whether Plato is 
confused about shifting from the practical to the theoretical conception of the 
philosopher.79 
 
An important point about the theory of Forms not being developed enough to fully base a 
reading on Plato on. It undoubtedly is a very important part of Plato’s theory, but without a 
coherent theory only parts can be taken into consideration at a time, any inconsistencies 
must then be discarded.  
It is worth noting that what both Annas and Cooper proposes as a defence for Plato 
in regards to the apparent fallacy is based on the Form of the Good, rather than the Forms 
as a theory of duality. They choose only to rely on what Socrates says about the Form of the 
Good, and as such discards any inconsistencies about the Forms that doesn’t align with that 
of the Form of the Good. It may fully be that they take the Form of the Good to be an 
illustration of the Forms as a whole, and as such support a fully-fledged theory about the 
Forms that has at its base the explanation of the Form of the Good. In such an event it is 
possible to rely on what is said about the Forms to settle Annas proposed question of 
whether or not Plato is confused in his shifting from the practical philosopher to the 
theoretical conception of the philosopher. If the theory of the Forms is understood through 
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the explanation of the Form of the Good, and the inconsistencies Annas mentions in book 10 
are downplayed, then the theory holds a certain amount of merit. The problem with this 
reading is that it still doesn’t save Plato’s exclamation that justice is worth having for its own 
sake and that it is always in our own best self-interest to act justly. Why would the 
philosopher return after seeing the Forms? It is not explained why it is in his best self-
interest to do so in this reading, it states that it is the just act to do, but not why it is just for 
the philosopher who has to do it, to him that would not be an action of justice, it would be 
an action of injustice towards his true meaning. 
 
He [Plato] would reject any distinction of practical and theoretical reasoning, and hence 
of the 'practical' and 'contemplative' conceptions of the philosopher; he would say that 
there was only one conception, that of the person in whom reason is supreme both in 
contemplating the Forms and in making good practical decisions.80 
 
This distinction becomes a problem when one takes into consideration that for an individual 
to be just, reason would have to rule the soul, and if there is no guarantee that reason 
overlaps with regards to both contemplating the Forms and in performing moral actions, 
then there is no certainty in the claim that if reason rules the soul in harmony then the 
person is just. The actions this person performs is not guaranteed to be just actions. The 
essence being that contemplation about the Forms is above everything else, Annas is here 
building upon the critique that there appears to be no solid foundation for why the 
philosopher should return to the cave, there is no solid foundation for the execution of 
moral acts seeing as there is a key missing for the motivation for these acts. The 
philosophers would be serving their self-interest by never returning to the cave, and just 
because they have seen the Forms it does not automatically follow that they will behave just 
in every circumstance and towards everyone else. Annas points to Aristotle and his example 
that young men may excel at mathematics (theoretical), but that they can at the same time 
be morally immature (practical), sound moral judgment comes with experience.81 The point 
being made is that knowing something in the theoretical sense does not necessarily mean 
that it will translate into one’s practical customs. 
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The real ground is stated at 519e-520a, and is repeated at 520e in the claim that we are 
making a ‘just order to just people'. The Guardians know what is just because they have 
the knowledge that is based on the Form of Good. Their return is demanded by the 
justice that prescribes disinterestedly what is best for all (519e-520a). They do not go 
down because it is better for them, they would be happier and better off doing 
philosophy. Nor do they sacrifice themselves altruistically for the others; the others do 
benefit by their rule, but so do they, for under any other rule they would suffer, 
deprived of their appropriate role of organizing society for the best.82 
 
Annas reaches a standpoint with her reasoning, and concludes that the philosophers will 
simply act out of accordance with the Forms, they will not act out of a search for happiness 
for either themselves or others; they will simply do what is impersonally best. She touches 
directly on the problem of motivation with this quote, but her conclusion leaves the problem 
unsolved. Justice is supposedly among the finest, if not the finest of all things, and is always 
the right choice to make because of itself and what comes from it. Annas concludes that this 
cannot be so because when the philosopher kings rule they do in fact sacrifice their own self-
interest, just because they don’t do it altruistically does not mean that they don’t do it.  
In Annas reading the problem of motivation remains an issue because even if the 
philosopher kings see that it is only when they themselves rule that they best can 
contemplate the Forms compared to other modes of government, they still don’t have any 
direct motivation for why they should rule. It is possible to imagine that if any other option 
arises in which the philosopher kings would be left completely alone to explore the Forms 
that they would immediately agree to, or perhaps they would even seek, such an 
arrangement. If a wealthy individual from another city-state would propose to the 
philosopher kings that they come live in the city from which he hailed and they would have 
all their physical needs taken care of so all their efforts could be aimed at the Forms, they 
would have no incentive in Annas reading to decline such an offer. It is even more likely that 
they would actively seek such arrangements because the only reason they rule is because 
that is the best possible way to acquire the most available time for contemplation of the 
Forms. 
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The problem of relevance is solved by Annas by her reading that Plato does not draw 
a line between the Vulgar and Platonic justice, rather she thinks his theory is a combination 
of these takes on justice, and as such there is no direct shift in the dialogue, it is only an 
elaboration of the foundation that has already been laid. 
 The problem of possibility is only visible in these articles when she addresses the 
philosophers as the only ones who can be just, she gives no more than a sentence or two in 
this regard at the end of her paper. So she acknowledges that there exists a problem in this, 
but gives it no more than that, that is, her understanding that this is an issue: 
 
In fact, the main argument, resumed in Books 8 and 9, does remain alive to the question 
that was posed at the beginning and answered in Book 4. The central books are not 
forgotten, and sometimes the philosopher appears in the contemplative role, but the 
main thrust of the following books follows through the attempt to show that justice is 
worth my while, is something that it benefits the individual agent to have. The glorious 
impersonality of the just person’s viewpoint disappears from the main argument. The 
central books, for all their striking effect, have sent the moral argument in a new, and 
disturbing, direction.83 
 
Annas sees Plato’s further development of his theory, after Book IV, as an elaboration that 
leads us back to the initial problem: why should I be just? She does in a sense combine the 
problem of motivation with the problem of possibility: why should I be just when it appears 
that only the philosopher can be just? 
 
VI.7 Dahl, O, Norman. “Plato's Defense of Justice” (1991) 
 
Dahl claims that Sachs’ focus on common justice is misplaced. Plato never intended for 
Socrates to answer any claim about a common conception of justice, the initial discussion 
and views on justice in Book I is merely initial. Nor does Socrates claim anywhere that he is 
going to be defending any particular definition of justice, so it is perfectly sound to allow him 
to start by making his own definition of justice and then let him defend this view. Dahl 
reasons that at most Plato thinks that conventional justice is partially correct in terms of 
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what a real theory of justice must contain, this is based on Socrates’ reliance on examples 
coined in conventional or common justice terms. (‘Don't return a knife to a crazy man’ 
against Cephalus (331). He claims that harming anyone is unjust to refute Polemarchus 
(335): thus he rejects part of conventional justice (harming enemies)).84 
With this in mind Dahl reformulates what Plato must do to be successful with his theory of 
justice in the Republic:  
- (i)To have a plausible account of justice he must show that platonically just people 
must to a significant extent be conventionally just.  
- (ii)To provide people with a proper motive for acting justly he must show that the 
performance of actions, which are to a great extent part of conventional or common 
justice, must be included in platonic justice.  
- (iii)To show that genuinely just actions are called just by Plato’s theory of justice he 
must show that what is branded as actions within conventional or common justice 
should, to great extent, promote or preserve the soul’s harmony.  
- (iv)To prevent his theory of justice from being unnecessary or mistaken he must 
show that he cannot commit himself to a theory of justice that involves reference to 
sensible things.85 
Plato cannot commit himself to a theory that involves sensible things because every possible 
definition that has this is open to the same argument he uses against Cephalus: there is 
always an instance where no matter what kind of just sensible action can be viewed as 
unjust. Dahl will, despite this obvious claim that act-centred theories always will have 
instances where they are seen as unjust, argue that Plato gives us a description of 
Platonically just acts.  
Dahl goes on to argue that point (i) and (ii) is fulfilled because reason rules the soul, and 
reason desires things that are required by one’s overall conception of the good, as well as 
knowledge and truth. The second aspect of reason's rule is platonic justice86, as well as the 
fact that the discussion about justice in the state in book VIII relies on this sort of reason’s 
rule; and in book IX it is this kind of reason’s rule that makes a just person happier and better 
off. The just person will, in light of this reasoning, do conventionally just things to great 
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extent, with his motive being the promotion of soul harmony. He fulfils point (i) and (ii) by 
arguing to them without assuming they are true. 
 The Platonically just person might still commit conventional injustice (e.g. steal), but 
Plato argues that doing so habitually will strengthen an irrational desire, and thereby 
eventually disturb soul harmony by disturbing the person's conception of the good (558-61 
and 588-9). One needs therefore to act in a conventionally just way in order to preserve soul 
harmony. 
 Point (iii) is met because if one needs to act conventionally just to preserve soul 
harmony, then it will preserve soul harmony to do so. Point (iv) is met because knowledge- 
and truth-related actions are not to be identified with sensible characteristics, these actions 
are specified via the Forms. Platonic justice does therefore not commit him to a rival theory 
of act-centred justice. 
 Dahl deals with the critique that the philosopher would rather contemplate the 
Forms than rule the city, by pointing out that the philosopher would want to imitate the 
Forms to as great an extent as possible. The Form of justice would lead the philosopher to 
see that it is just for him to rule the city and by him ruling the city he is acting in accordance 
with the Forms. It is this same love of Forms that makes the philosopher act conventionally 
just. In regards to defending “the noble lie” Dahl argues that the philosopher’s love of the 
Forms again will solve the issue. By lying in order to bring about platonic justice the 
individual’s motive is an impartial desire to instantiate platonic justice, i.e. the Form of 
justice, and this can be viewed as a motivating factor for acting justly for justice’s own sake. 
 Dahl then showcases similarities between Plato’s theories and intuitionism.87 The 
similarity being that in Platonic justice things can be just because they exhibit an in-
articulable goodness, these things become clear after one has reached insight into the Form 
of goodness, and one can after having reached this insight use one’s intuition to judge 
whether an action is good. Actions of this type overlaps with conventionally just actions, and 
one can therefore use one’s intuition to judge whether an action is conventionally just or 
not, based on one’s knowledge of the Forms, and in particular, the Form of the good or the 
Form of goodness. This is important because it explains Dahl’s claim that Plato’s theory of 
justice is both act- and agent-centred, platonic justice is found only in souls and is centred on 
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the agent, but platonic goodness can also be found in actions. So the conclusion that 
platonically just people’s actions are platonically just only because platonically just people 
performed them, is now equal to platonically good actions. Just actions must also be good 
actions, and even if justice is internal to the agent, good actions is external. 
 The critique that even if one knows that an action is good one must not necessarily 
do said action is answered by the conclusion that anyone who truly knows the Forms will 
always want to act in accordance with them, and so nobody who truly knows an action to be 
Good will never want to not act in accordance with it. 
 Another problem is how one can decide which action is the right action in situations 
where people disagree about the right action, both basing their view on their knowledge of 
the Forms and their intuitions. In such a situation at least one and perhaps all disagreeing 
parts in the argument is necessarily wrong in their conclusion. The Forms are in fixed 
positions, there is only one possible correct action in every circumstance when one act in 
correct accordance with the Forms. 
 The problem of possibility is not solved by Dahl, but because of his focus on the 
Forms it is reasonable to assume that he thinks that justice is achievable only when proper 
insight into the Forms is reached, i.e. only the philosopher kings can be just. 
 
VI.8 Kraut, Richard, “The Defense of Justice in Plato’s Republic” (1992) 
 
Kraut holds that the solution to defending Plato’s theory is by looking into what Plato says 
about the Forms. The philosopher’s imitation of the Forms will entail that even though ruling 
the city will be a hindrance to fully contemplating the Forms, it will be the just thing to do, 
and it will be in accordance with the Forms: 
 
He [Socrates] tells us at one point that when philosophers look to the harmonious 
arrangement of the Forms, they develop a desire to imitate that harmony in some way 
or other (500c). And then he adds that if it becomes necessary for the philosophers to 
imitate the Forms by molding human character in their likeness, they will be in an 
excellent position to do this job well.88 
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When the philosophers rule, they do not stop imitating or studying the Forms, the fact that 
they rule the city is a form of contemplation of the Forms. When the philosophers rule the 
city their understanding for harmony and order in the city increases. The reason Socrates 
puts ruling under contemplation in regards to the happiest life a philosopher can live is not 
because ruling is removed from contemplation, but because the purely theoretical study of 
the Forms is superior of the practical aspect of imitating the Forms in the physical world, this 
is because theoretical contemplation of the Forms is closer to the Forms than any physical 
object or aspect can be. 
 Kraut also highlights a sort of responsibility the philosophers have to the city, the 
physical world, and to each other: 
 
…were they to refuse to rule, they would be allowing the disorder in the city to increase. 
Were any single philosopher to shirk her responsibilities, and let others do more than 
their fair share, then she would be undermining a fair system of dividing responsibilities. 
The order that would be appropriate to their situation would be undermined. And so 
failure to rule, whether in an individual philosopher or in a group of them, would create 
a certain disharmony in the world: Relationships that are appropriate among people 
would be violated. And in creating this disharmony, the philosopher would in one 
respect cease to imitate the Forms. She would gaze at the order that is appropriate 
among Forms but would thereby upset an order that is appropriate among human 
beings.89 
 
The responsibility is a consequence of the order found in the Forms, any action that would 
create any form of disharmony in the philosopher’s imitation of the Forms would be an 
action that broke this responsibility. Seeing as the responsibility is a direct link to the 
imitation of the Forms, breaking it would be acting against the Forms, and acting in such a 
way is against the very nature of the philosopher. The philosopher knows that the type of 
life that offers the most and best types of pleasure is the one belonging to the philosopher  
(580c-588a); it is the happiest life possible, even though pure contemplation would be 
better, but pure contemplation is not possible, because it breaks with the Forms and would 
be an unjust life. Therefore Kraut must agree that Socrates could not literally mean that pure 
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contemplation is the best possible life, because by Kraut’s reasoning that would be a life that 
does not imitate the Forms. A possible solution is to see Socrates’ remark as an abstract 
statement of fact, as in the fact that if the philosopher could live perfectly just without 
having to govern the ideal city that life would be better, but it is not possible so the 
philosopher will live the best possible life available, and that life entails ruling the city and 
imitating the Forms in the physical world. 
 
VI.9 Cooper, M, John, “Two Theories of Justice” (2000) 
 
Cooper starts with laying forth the two theories of justice represented in the Republic; the 
first theory is represented by Glaucon (and Adeimantus and Thrasymacus); the second is the 
extensive theory laid forth by Socrates in the remaining 8 and a half books. 
 Glaucon’s theory differs mainly from Socrates’ theory, in Cooper’s view, in that 
Glaucon portrays justice as not to harm others, and not to be harmed be others, and with a 
focus on each making what he can for himself without being hindered by others, and he 
himself not being a hindrance to others. This view portrays justice as a sort of principle of 
‘the self-made man’, Glaucon means that one should be fully justified in pursuing wealth and 
resources for one’s own personal use, one owes nobody anything, as long as this pursuit 
does not overstep these same rights found in others.  
Socrates on the other hand puts forth a theory that has at its base a view that justice 
entails that everyone takes part in an (more or less) equal share of all wealth and resources 
that can be produced by a community. Socrates’ theory also sees people doing and keeping 
to one’s own, but what is being produced should be put to use by the collective, rather than 
Glaucon’s theory which sees what is being produced put to use by the individual. Cooper 
contrasts Glaucon’s theory with Socrates’ focus on community rather than individual: 
“…justice requires that the citizens shall individually each spend some of their time working 
for the good of their fellow-citizens, in fair exchange for the similar work of each of the 
others for their good.”90 
Cooper has as his aim to justify why the philosopher kings would want to rule. He 
maintains91 that they would want to rule because the Forms constitute a form of order that 
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the philosopher’s would want to replicate, this form of order is replicated as well as possible 
by the philosopher’s walking the line between pure contemplation of the Forms as well as 
their participation in ruling the city. “…[the philosopher kings] own good, as rational agents, 
consists in maintaining rational order in their souls and their lives through the pursuit of 
these aims [contemplating the Forms and ruling the city] in that combined way.”92 Cooper 
showcases his view that in order to maintain order and harmony in their own souls the 
philosophers must also contribute to ruling the city. 
The philosophers will also realize that they owe the city the responsibility of ruling 
because of the unique opportunity they have been given in this city to almost exclusive 
contemplation of the Forms. They will see that it is just that they too contribute to the 
overall happiness and order of the city and will therefore be motivated by a sense of justice 
and “guilt” to rule. They will by this also make sure that the Forms are followed as closely as 
possible in the physical world under their rule in the ideal city, and as such they imitate the 
Forms when they rule. 
When dealing with the problem of possibility Cooper says: “For Socrates, then, the 
just life led by all is at the same time the best, happiest life for each. At any rate, it is the best 
and happiest that their individual natural capabilities make possible for them.”93 This seems 
to indicate divisions of happiness within different types of people. In other words, that the 
amount of happiness would differ in the different classes in the ideal city. He further 
explains his views on this subject in the footnote connected to the passage just quoted. He 
reasons, that the ordinary people inhabiting the ideal city, when they follow the philosopher 
kings rule and guidance, will live, perhaps not the best possible life available for a person (I 
read this to indicate that this life is only possible for the philosopher kings), but they will at 
any rate live the best possible life available for them.94 Cooper does not answer the question 
explicitly, he points out that the best possible life that in fact anybody can live is a life where 
one is part of the ideal city. He does not showcase whether or not the other classes beside 
the philosopher kings will achieve maximum happiness, happiness and justice seem to go 
hand in hand. What is interesting, if one take this to be true (that only the philosopher kings 
has the potential for maximum happiness), is that the philosopher kings cannot achieve 
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maximum happiness neither in the ideal state. Cooper brings up this fact himself, referring 
to the passage in the Republic at 519c-521b in which Socrates says that the philosopher 
kings in fact would live a happier life if they were to live in retirement aimed solely at 
contemplation of the Forms. Cooper defends this, as I have already mentioned, by pointing 
to the fact that it would not be possible to live as philosopher’s the way they do in the ideal 
city anywhere else, with their education and them being allowed to spend most of their time 
focusing on purely intellectual endeavours. Cooper continues to insists that with Socrates’ 
focus on everyone doing their own in order to make the community as happy as possible 
would lead to everyone on an individual level living as good a life as possible. If this is true 
then the philosophers would indeed be living the best, and happiest life available to them. It 
appears that Cooper views Socrates’ utterance as more of a thought experiment that never 
truly could be reality, there could never in reality be a situation where the philosopher 
would be able to purely pursue insight into the Forms, but if such a scenario was possible, he 
would be even happier than he is when both ruling and contemplating the Forms.  
 
VI.10 Brown, Eric, “Minding the Gap in Plato’s ‘Republic’” (2003) 
 
Brown argues that there exists no gap in Plato’s writing, and bases his arguments in most 
part on the education portrayed in the Republic.  “The claim that good education suffices for 
the motivations to help others is supported by the ways in which the philosophical education 
does and does not change the guardians' motivations.”95 Brown portrays Plato as never 
having envisioned the gap because a “good education is both sufficient to produce 
motivations to do what justice requires and necessary to produce a just soul”96. Brown 
arriving at this conclusion is justified by some of the declarations from Socrates:  
 
When he enumerates "the traits necessary for the soul that is going to have a sufficient 
and complete grasp of what is" (486el-3; cf. 491a9-b2), he includes the harmonized 
desires that entail moderation and justice (485a-486b). When he completes his 
discussion of the ascent out of the cave, he suggests that a person can be brought to 
look at true things only after having "been hammered at from childhood and freed from 
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the bonds of kinship with becoming" (519a8-bl). In addition to such remarks that 
suggest that good early childhood education is necessary for the cultivation of 
philosophers' perfectly just motivations, Socrates very explicitly says that people who 
are philosophical by nature but are raised poorly will be corrupted and will fail to attain 
the philosophical way of life and its perfectly just soul (490e2-4, 491el-3, 495a4-8). If 
being raised poorly is sufficient to prevent the development of psychological justice, 
then not being raised poorly is necessary for developing a just soul. So if Socrates also 
thinks that being raised poorly and being raised well are contradictories, with no tertium 
quid between them, then he is committing himself to our necessity thesis. At least one 
passage suggests that being raised poorly and being raised well are contradictories 
(492al-5) and so there is good reason to infer that Socrates is committed to the 
necessity thesis.97 
 
Brown shows the importance of education and upbringing, but he does not present a 
guarantee that a correct upbringing will lead to a just soul. Brown relies on the fact that the 
goal of the ideal education presented in the Kallipolis is to instil in the citizens a love of the 
correct ethical ideals (386a-391c). When these ideals are instilled, and a citizen loves these 
ideals, acting according to these ideals is in the person’s self-interest, just as much as the 
philosopher acting according to the Forms is his self-interest. This neatly solves the problem 
of motivation, still unclear is whether or not the motivation for acting justly can be 
accomplished by any other individual than the philosophers. Perhaps Brown means that 
seeing as the education gives the individuals a love of the right ideals, i.e. just ideals, that 
this is correct motivation, it can then not be the case that philosophers have the only correct 
motivation, there must exist more than one correct way of motivating just actions. I don’t 
believe Plato would agree that there is more than one correct way for motivation for acting 
justly, but because he says it is always in everyone’s best interest to always act justly, there 
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VI.11 Singpurwalla, G.K., Rachel, “Plato's Defense of Justice in the Republic” (2006) 
 
Rachel Singpurwalla takes it upon herself to categorize the different approaches previous 
commentators have made and point out their weaknesses before she herself presents her 
own theory. She claims that previous articles fall inn under one of the following three 
methods: 
 
Indirect justice strategy (i): The individual with a just soul acts on certain values and desires; 
the satisfaction of which happens to be incompatible with unjust actions. An individual with 
a just soul is fully dedicated to acquiring and acting on his knowledge of what would be the 
best course of action, and in doing so the individual lacks the typical desires that leads to 
unjust actions. This psychological just person closes the gap between psychological and 
practical justice because he is foremost psychologically just, but by being so he is not in 
possession of desires that might lead him to act unjustly. He has no motivation for acting 
unjustly and will therefore refrain from acting unjustly, and the gap is closed. 
Issue: The good of others is in no consideration when the just individual considers what to 
do. Example with the guardians, the philosophers take turns ruling the city, but this is second 
to their true meaning which is pure intellectual pursuits. Then the action of ruling the city 
would be a hindrance to achieving this and it is unclear then why the guardians would even 
bother ruling the city. 
 
Impartial justice approach (ii): The individual with a just soul knows what is objectively good 
and is directly motivated to bring about the objective good in the world. The just individual 
that is ruled by reason has as his primary aim to have and act on the knowledge of what is 
truly good, and the object of this knowledge is the form of the good. Having knowledge of 
the Form of the good is to have knowledge of good itself, it is impersonal and simpliciter. As 
such the argument goes that one that has this knowledge will eliminate the problem of 
individual justice, because one does not deem what is the best for oneself, one deems what 
is the best action for everything; what action is in accordance with the knowledge one has 
about the Form of the good. 
Issue: Sacrificing one’s own particular self-interest for the sake of the common good. The 
example with the guardians is useful here as well, giving up ones intellectual endeavors for 
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the sake of ruling the city. It is unclear how this theory supports Socrates’ claim that it is 
always in our best interest to be just when by subscribing to the impartial justice theory one 
allows for cases where an individual sacrifices one’s own self-interest. 
 
Self-interested justice approach (iii): The individual with a just soul sees her good as realized 
in having regard for the good of others. The issue of the impartial justice approach is solved 
by explaining why it is in the philosophers interest to rule, it is indeed in conflict with the 
primary desire of the philosopher, but by ruling the philosopher is imitating the Forms, and 
in 500b-c Socrates states that the Forms themselves constitute a just order; so if anyone is to 
imitate the Forms they must be just. Seeing as Socrates proclaims that it is just for the 
philosopher to rule, philosophers must perform the just act of ruling to imitate the Forms 
and hence act in their own self-interest. 
Issue: The guardians want to rule because they are in such action imitating the Forms. The 
problem arises because then only the very few would ever be able to be just, if the only way 
to be truly just and maintain self-interest is by knowledge of the forms. Only the guardians 
can hope to be just in its right sense and so have a self-interested reason to consider the 
good of others. For people who do not know the Forms they will have at best an indirect 
reason to act justly, by following the ideals taught them by the philosophers who bases 
these ideals on the Forms. The reason for these people to act justly has nothing to do with 
concern for the good of others, at least not in the right sense. 
 
Having presented and criticized these previous attempts to solve the issues surrounding the 
theory of justice found in the Republic Singpurwalla presents her own theory, which she calls 
the ‘Unification theory’: 
 
Unification theory (iv): Happiness98  resides, at least in part, in being unified with other 
people. Being unified with others requires that we consider their own good in our decision-
making; specifically, it requires that we see their good as our own good. Acting unjustly is 
incompatible with being unified with others, and is as a result incompatible with our own 
happiness. 
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Issue: Socrates might mean by unity that one is simply unified with oneself.  
This issue can be solved by Socrates analogy about the tyrant. “Always a master to 
one man or a slave to another and never getting a taste of true freedom or true friendship” 
(576a). External and internal conflict causes the tyrant unhappiness. 
Socrates characterizes the ideal city as happy because of the unity found between 
the individuals in the city.99 
The guardians will want to rule the city because their happiness depends on unity, which 
in turn depends on considering the welfare of others, and the welfare of others is for him to 
rule the city. This should indicate that there is no need to force them to rule, and as 
previously shown this is a prominent part of how the philosopher kings go about ruling. 
I will use Singpurwalla’s approach as a foundation for two of my own approaches in my 
solutions to the problem of motivation100, and the problem of possibility101, and as such I will 
give my critique of this approach together with my own proposed solutions, seeing as it is 
more fitting in that context. 
 
VI.12 Kamtekar, Rachana, “Ethics and politics in Socrates’ defense of justice” (2010) 
 
Kamtekar elaborates on Socrates’ focus on the just city in Book II-IV of the Republic, in her 
article she claims that by seeing the proper link between the just city and the just soul the 
fallacy presented by Sachs will no longer be an issue. 
 
…the account of justice in the city ensures that the justice in the soul Socrates is 
going to describe remains connected to the justice of actions. In other words, 
while Socrates defines justice in the city and in the soul in terms of the internal 
harmonious relations of the parts, he does not leave behind just action-types.102 
 
Kamtekar writes that the laws created by the guardians, executed by the auxiliaries, and 
followed by the producers are laws created to showcase just actions, and any action allowed 
                                                          
99 Sinpurwalla 2006, 277 
100 Chapter VIII.4. 
101 Chapter IX.5. 
102 Kamtekar 2010, 72 
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by the laws will be a just action. This is exemplified by Socrates’ censoring of what stories 
and in what fashion they should be allowed to be told to the people of the ideal city. These 
stories are censored in such a manner as to exemplify what actions are virtuous and vicious, 
just and unjust, they can therefore be seen as examples of Platonically just actions, and 
these actions are by law the way they are (the stories are not allowed other incarnations 
than the ones presented by Socrates, and others having undergone similar censorship). The 
law keeps the stories the way they must be, and as a consequence the law has by default a 
great deal of actions that are considered virtuous and just, and their counterparts are to be 
considered vicious and unjust. 
 
…when Glaucon says that the philosophers will agree to rule the city because Socrates’ 
speech urging them to rule is saying just things to just people (520d–e), we should read 
this to mean: ruling is their job, and they are just-souled people, whose soul-parts each 
do their job, so they will do their job of ruling.103 
 
The motivation the philosophers have for ruling the city rather than solely choosing 
intellectual endeavours is in Kamtekar’s reading a result of their position in the city. They are 
placed as rulers in the city to rule, the motivation would then be that this is doing their own. 
Contemplating the Forms and ruling is their job, when they do both they do and have their 
own, and that is what makes it just.  
 When it comes to the question of happiness, and whether or not being just will lead 
to the maximum possible amount of happiness, Kamtekar reasons that because the laws 
Socrates designs for the ideal city aims not to make any one particular class extraordinarily 
happy, but rather the aim is to make the city as a whole as happy as possible. All members of 
the ideal city will be as happy as possible, because the laws are not designed to be in favour 
of one class more than another, but to fulfil the needs for all groups equally. This is obviously 
no great problem because the three classes have different desires and needs and fulfilling 
them will simply be a matter of seeing these different desires and needs and act accordingly. 
The true challenge will be to create laws that treat all members of the different classes 
equally, and laws that will deal with members of the same class equally: 
 
                                                          
103 Kamtekar 2010, 74-75 
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…in response to Glaucon’s complaint that he is doing the philosophers an injustice by 
requiring them to rule when they do not want to (519d), Socrates repeats that the aim 
of the law is not to make any class in the city outstandingly happy but to spread 
happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with one another by 
persuasion or compulsion and by making them share with each other the benefits that 
each can confer on the community (519e–520a).104 
 
Kamtekar raises two questions that receive no solution: What would the philosopher’s jobs 
be outside of the ideal city (seeing as it is only in the Kallipolis that they are obligated to 
rule), Socrates mentions philosopher’s that have grown up “on their own” (520a-c), but can 
these philosopher’s ever be as just or have equal insight into the Forms as the philosopher’s 
that grow up in the Kallipolis? And number two, what can be said of actions that fall outside 
of the ‘having and doing one’s own’? Kamtekar does not entertain the possibility that 
perhaps Plato sees all possible actions and scenarios as falling under one of the 
groups/individual’s “own”, and that there does not exist actions that would not 
automatically be solved by looking to who should do what in the situation. Every possible 
action that can be performed is in one way or another connected to doing and having one’s 
own, and is therefore always judged to be just when the person acts in accordance to what 
is his/hers and what is not.  
The problem of motivation is not solved sufficiently because it gives no answer to 
why the philosopher kings will have to be forced to rule (520a-b). The problem of possibility 
is cleverly answered because justice takes the shape of the laws in the ideal city, and all 
citizens of the Kallipolis would then be able to be just. What motivates them to act just for 
the sake of justice’s own sake however is quite unclear. 
 
VI.13 Summary of the Research-Tradition as a Whole 
 
The articles presented here span almost five decades of research and represent an 
interesting evolution in argumentation for solving the problems of Plato’s theory of justice in 
the Republic. Here I have summarized each article’s main approach and relation to the three 
problems to illustrate the aforementioned evolution in a straightforward manner: 
                                                          




1963 - Sachs – Sachs’ article introduces the problem of relevance. 
1964 - Demos – Demos claims that Sachs’ is wrong in his claim of a fallacy because in his 
reading of the Republic justice entails that one wants the good for others, and because of 
this a person will act justly in the vulgar sense. 
1973 - Vlastos – Vlastos interpret ‘doing one’s own’ to mean that no one will act commonly 
unjust. The “shift” that Sachs points out does not happen, because the social aspect of 
justice is directly linked to actions as it deals with each person’s best contribution to the 
polis. The problem of motivation is not acknowledged. 
1973 - Kraut – Kraut points out that the just man will have no incentive for acting unjustly. 
Problem of motivation is still not acknowledged. 
1977 - Cooper – Cooper is the first to present a defence that relies on an understanding of 
the Forms: The philosopher kings will want to replicate what they have seen in the Forms 
and as such they will never act unjustly. Again no solid answer to the problem of motivation.  
1981 - Annas – Annas claims that Plato “moves” from act-centred to agent-centred, and that 
the theory is meant to be a hybrid between the two. It can be seen to both commit and not 
commit a fallacy because of its inclusion of agent focus in an act centred discussion. The 
forms leave the philosophers to be completely impartial and always perform the best 
possible action. The best possible situation for the philosopher kings is that they rule, 
because this leaves them with the most time for contemplation. Annas has no focus on the 
problem of motivation, but she acknowledges the problem of possibility. 
1991 - Dahl – Dahl claims that Socrates never had to defend vulgar justice, because Book I is 
supposed to be understood as merely initial, furthermore, it contains several views on 
justice, some which differs from the view Sachs calls “vulgar justice”. Dahl’s solution has a 
reliance on the Forms, and the problem of motivation is solved by a constant wish to bring 
about the Forms in the physical world. Dahl formulates four points for what Plato must do to 
be successful with his theory of justice in the Republic, and among these points is a version 
of the problem of motivation. This point can be seen as the first solid introduction of the 
problem of motivation. 
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1992 - Kraut – Kraut holds that the Forms are the solution. Imitating them makes the 
philosopher unable to act commonly unjust. The act of ruling is part of their contemplation 
of the Forms because they try to bring about the physical aspect of the Forms. Does not 
consider the problem of motivation. 
2000 - Cooper – “[The philosopher kings] own good, as rational agents, consists in 
maintaining rational order in their souls and their lives through the pursuit of these aims 
[contemplating the Forms and ruling the city] in that combined way.”105 The philosopher 
kings will see that it is just that they too contribute to the overall happiness and order of the 
city and will therefore be motivated by a sense of justice and “guilt” to rule. Cooper has a 
comment which is relevant to the problem of possibility, but he does find it an area of focus. 
2003 - Brown – Brown argues that there is no need for a bridge between platonic and vulgar 
justice. A “good education is both sufficient to produce motivations to do what justice 
requires and necessary to produce a just soul”106. He solves both the problem of relevance 
and the problem of motivation. Still no good answer to why the philosopher kings would 
need to be forced to rule. The problem of possibility is not acknowledged. 
2006 - Singpurwalla – Singpurwalla presents a thematic walkthrough of the different 
approaches previously presented107. Happiness resides, at least in part, in being unified with 
other people. Being unified with others requires that we consider their own good in our 
decision-making; specifically, it requires that we see their good as our own good. Acting 
unjustly is incompatible with being unified with others, and is as a result incompatible with 
our own happiness. Solves the problem of relevance, the problem of motivation, and the 
problem of possibility, but in unsatisfactory ways. Why would the guardians need to be 
forced to rule? 
2010 - Kamtekar – Kamtekar proposes a solution based on the laws in the ideal city. The laws 
created by the guardians, executed by the auxiliaries, and followed by the producers will be 
laws created to showcase just actions, and any actions allowed by the laws will be just 
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107 See VI.11 
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actions. The philosopher kings are placed as rulers in the city to rule, the motivation would 
then be that this is doing their own. 
 
The first instance I have identified in my walkthrough of a recognition of the problem of 
motivation is in Dahl’s article in 1991, this is ten years after Annas have acknowledged the 
problem of possibility, yet the problem that is in focus in the later articles is the problem of 
motivation. Why the problem of possibility is not transferred through to the other scholars 
that follow I cannot say. This is especially curious because when Cooper shifts the focus to 
the Forms a great number of the following articles seem to follow in the same direction, 
although the true nature of the Forms and how to apply them to Plato’s theory differ, so it 
appears that a shift in views can affect the coming research in a very prominent way. In 
addition it is peculiar that none of the scholars truly give a good explanation as to how the 
philosopher kings are acting out of self-interest even as they are being forced to rule the 
city, i.e. acting justly. Both Brown and Singpurwalla should have solid explanations because 
of their recognition of the problem. 
 My best guess is that most of the commentators seem primarily occupied with 
showing different views on how Socrates actually bridges the gap Sachs claim exist – or 
denying the gaps existence – the other issues I have identified seem to be secondary 
concerns, if mentioned at all. 














VII: Solving the Problem of Relevance 
 
The problem of relevance arises with Sachs’ article “A fallacy in Plato’s Republic”108 and deals 
with the fact that at the beginning of the Republic the interlocutors (including Socrates) all 
operate with a view that justice is to be (roughly) understood as “every man his due”, but 
that this Vulgar justice, during the course of Book II through Book IV, in Socrates’ hands is 
transformed into a state of one’s soul – a conception of justice by Sachs called “Platonic 
justice”. The problem of relevance is Socrates’ defence of a different kind of justice than the 
one he was tasked with, Sachs holds that the initial challenge did not include any notion of 
justice as something more than actions that were commonly viewed as just in ancient 
Athens. Vlastos further elaborates on the problem problem in the following way: 
 
It [Socrates definition of ‘dikaiosyne’] presents no discernible link with ordinary usage. 
What people commonly understood by ‘dikaiosyne’ we know from a wide variety of 
sources, including Aristotle’s splendid analysis in the opening paragraphs of Book VI of 
the Nicomachean Ethics. The word could carry a sense broad enough to cover all 
virtuous conduct toward others, though for the most part it was used in a more specific 
sense to mean refraining from ‘pleonexia’109. … If a contemporary had been told that 
there is an enviable state of the soul, characterized by proper functioning of every one 
of its parts, only by accident could he have guessed that this is supposed to be the moral 
attribute of justice.110 
 
This passage highlights the issue quite well, one must assume that Socrates’ interlocutors 
are what Vlastos refers to as “contemporary”, and the understanding of ‘dikaiosyne’ 
explained by Vlastos would be the understanding shared by Socrates’ interlocutors in the 
dialogue, and as such the challenge Socrates seeks to answer comes from such a view of 
justice. Glaucon and Adeimantus, and the rest of the participants of the dialogue operates 
                                                          
108 Sachs, David. (1963). “A Fallacy in Plato's Republic”. The Philosophical Review 72.2: 141–158. 
109 Vlastos definition of ‘pleonexia’: “…gaining some advantage for oneself by grabbing what belongs to another 
– his property, his wife, his office, and the like –or by denying him what is (morally or legally) due him –
fulfillment of promises made to him, repayment of monies owed to him, respect for his good name and 
reputation, and so forth” (Vlastos 1969, 507) 
110 Vlastos 1969, 507-508 
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with the view that justice is primarily the refraining from ‘pleonexia’, and because of this fact 
Socrates is first and foremost tasked with defending this conception of justice. 
The problem is to show that even with the shift from vulgar to platonic justice, 
Socrates defends justice on the same premise as he was asked, by showing that platonic 
justice entails being just in the ordinary sense. Or one can argue against Sachs’ view that 
there is a shift, and that Socrates in fact answers the question of justice on the same 
foundation as the question. I shall argue that platonic justice indeed does contain a concept 
of “every man his due”, as well as showcasing that Socrates does not need to define justice 
with Vulgar justice in mind to remain consistent, because there exists a notion of justice as 
something more than “every man his due” amongst the interlocutors before he is tasked 
with defining and defending justice. These different approaches are both meant as different 
solutions to Sachs’ claim, and they both have their advantages and disadvantages as 
solutions. 
I will argue that Socrates lays forth a theory that contains both vulgar and platonic 
justice. That it is a theory that relies on being both agent- and act-centred, and as such 
Socrates answers, and adds to, the conception of justice Sachs has called “vulgar justice”. 
The act-centred view put forth by Socrates is in my view not only refraining from ‘pleonexia’, 
it is all acts that can be considered just, they are acts that are universally just, the 
importance is that these acts are independent of acts falling under ‘pleonexia’ because they 
are inherently right actions. Actions that are inherently just is fundamentally different from 
actions that are not unjust, and I hold that the act-centred part of Plato’s theory 
understands just acts as inherently just, and therefore always worth performing. 
I will also make the case that there in fact exists a notion of justice as something 
more than “every man his due” before Socrates brings it into play. 
 
VII.1 Platonic justice entails vulgar justice 
 
Sachs also claims that Plato would need to show that a vulgar just man will be a platonic just 
man. I disagree that Plato would have to argue that the vulgar just man would be 
platonically just as well. Because Socrates lays forth a theory which is supposed to be a 
theory defining the true nature of justice, and that this “more true” nature is what is 
referred to as platonic justice is then the proper way to understand justice, and this proper 
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way should entail the common conception of justice (every man his due). Socrates is 
according to Sachs challenged to defend the common conception of justice, and in so doing 
Sachs claim that he introduces a new concept of justice, but as long as the common 
conception is contained in this “new” concept of justice Socrates will have answered his 
challenge. Platonic justice contains vulgar justice, but vulgar justice does not have to, nor 
does it in my view, contain platonic justice. 
Socrates does offer up several examples of common ethical situations, and it is 
shown how a Platonically just man acts in these instances. “If there are still any doubts in our 
soul about this, we could dispel them altogether by appealing to ordinary cases.” (442d-e). 
Socrates and Glaucon agree that platonic justice necessarily is the proper definition of 
justice, and to completely defend this view Socrates now offers to show it in practice when 
considering everyday cases: The platonically just man will be the least likely to embezzle, 
rob, commit thefts, betray friends, be untrustworthy, commit adultery, disrespect his 
parents, and neglect the gods (442d-443b). I interpret these scenarios as being illustrations 
of the fact that the platonically just man will be the least likely to act unjustly in the ordinary 
sense in any way, Socrates answers the claim that he set out to because Platonic justice 
entails vulgar justice. 
So far I have shown what Socrates himself claims, but it remains unproven. It is 
important that Socrates thought that his theory showed that the just man would refrain 
from committing what I interpret as a list of actions deemed commonly unjust, because by 
believing this it is far more likely to exist proof of this in the dialogue111, that is, proof that 
Socrates’ just man will act commonly just. 
 David Sachs’ issue becomes irrelevant if one views Plato’s theory as a theory that 
does not only ascribe to the physical world of actions, illustrated by the use of Sachs’ 
conception of “vulgar justice” which contains ordinary concepts of justice (summarized by 
the idea of “every man his due”), nor does Plato’s theory consist only of the purely abstract 
state of one’s soul in which justice is understood as proper alignment of the different parts 
of the soul, where a state of harmony is created when reason rules with the assistance of 
spirit and the appetitive part is being properly controlled, and all these parts have the right 
desires. The proper way to view Plato’s theory is by combining these views, or perhaps more 
                                                          
111 Contrasted by notions merely hinted at the Platonic dialogues, which then requires a fair amount of 
interpretations just to show what Socrates believes. 
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rightly put: Plato puts forth a theory of justice that both deals with common conceptions, 
with a focus on actions, as well as focusing on the abstract idea of soul harmony, and 
therefore also focuses on the agent. Soul harmony is the most important aspect of justice, 
but this harmony is not independent of just actions, the performance of just actions is a part 
of the development of the soul harmony a just soul requires. The just man will need to 
perform just actions in order to exercise and maintain his just soul. Plato shows that his 
theory in fact is somewhere in the middle and can be viewed as a hybrid112 between an 
agent-centred and an act-centred theory. Taking this into consideration upon revisiting the 
issue of whether vulgar justice entails platonic justice I can now establish a new reason why I 
don’t think that this is the case. Whereas Vulgar justice deals only with the actions 
commonly understood as unjust in ancient Athens, and as such offers no apparent 
consideration for the soul of any person committing such acts, it can be viewed as a form of 
justice dealing with the physical world. Platonic justice however has its feet in both the 
external world of actions and in the internal world of the soul, it contains the concept of 
vulgar justice but this concept alone does not qualify as the full definition of justice, this 
definition requires a theory of the just soul. So by moving from vulgar justice to platonic 
justice Socrates adds the element of a just soul, while keeping the notion of just acts. This is 
why Socrates shows us that the just person has a rightly ordered soul, because it is necessary 
for being just, and this is also why he gives a number of examples for what actions are 
viewed as just (442d-443b), because acting in accordance with these just actions are also a 
necessity for being just. It is not a pure agent-centred theory because there exist actions that 
qualifies as just regardless of who performs them, but it cannot be viewed as a pure act-
centred theory either because for a person to be deemed just his soul must be in harmony.  
So, in my view, Socrates incorporates vulgar justice in platonic justice, but there is no reason 
for why he should prove that vulgar justice would contain platonic justice. The fallacy Sachs’ 
claims exist is not valid even if Socrates lays forth a theory of justice that was not the 
common view of justice in ancient Athens, because Socrates incorporates the ordinary view 
in his theory there can be no true fallacy. 
 
                                                          
112 The theory is hybrid insofar as it has two distinctive parts that together make up the whole, but I don’t think 
that Socrates sees the two parts as equals, I think he places soul-harmony as the main focus of his theory with 
just actions as an important supporting factor for the just soul. 
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VII.2 It is necessary to perform just actions to promote justice in the soul 
 
In the final passages of Book IV Socrates presents the analogy that acting justly and acting 
unjustly is to be viewed in regards to the soul as healthy and unhealthy things is to be 
viewed in regards to the body: 
 
So, if justice and injustice is really clear enough to us, then acting justly, acting unjustly, 
and doing injustice are also clear. 
 How so? 
 Because just and unjust actions are no different for the soul than healthy and 
unhealthy things are for the body. 
 In what way? 
 Healthy things produce health, unhealthy ones disease. 
 Yes. 
 And don’t just actions produce justice in the soul and unjust ones injustice? 
 Necessarily.113 
 
The claim that Socrates presents a hybrid theory that includes both actions and a state of 
soul harmony is in my view confirmed by such a statement that is presented here. Socrates 
tells us that the performance of actions in a certain way will promote the state of one’s soul. 
Socrates has explained that the man with a rightly ordered soul, i.e. a just soul, will be the 
least likely man to act unjustly in regards to “ordinary cases” (442e) and now, just a few 
statements later, he adds that the just man indeed will need to act justly in such cases 
because it is necessary to act justly to produce justice in the soul. The theory Socrates 
presents has clear signs of belonging to the physical as well as the spiritual realms, and that 
it is only by being just in both that one can be truly just. 
 
VII.3 The initial discussion of justice includes more than “vulgar justice” 
 
When Cephalus is a part of the conversation in Book I he says the following: “A good person 
wouldn’t easily bear old age if he were poor, but a bad one wouldn’t be at peace with 
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himself even if he were wealthy.” (330a) Such a comment draws Sachs claim of a fallacy into 
question, by bringing to light the fact that Cephalus indicates that a “bad” person, which I 
read as an unjust person, “wouldn’t be able to live with himself even if he were wealthy” 
seems to include something along the lines that him being at peace with himself is linked to 
whether or not he is just, i.e. that justice contains some sense of properly ordered inner 
harmony – here understood as the state of the soul of the “good person” in contrast to that 
of the “bad” person. Cephalus seems to hold that the fact that this hypothetical man is “bad” 
mean that he will find it difficult to live with himself, while a person that is “good” will find it 
far easier. Socrates does not answer such a claim in his following discussion with Cephalus, 
and this fact alone can be viewed as an understanding between all the interlocutors that 
justice very well contains more than just “every man his due”, and it may well be that 
instances like this explains why nobody tells Socrates that he moves away from his task of 
defending justice understood as “vulgar justice”. When Adeimantus and Glaucon challenges 
Socrates I find two instances where it appears that they view justice as perhaps something 
more than “every man his due”: 
 
Therefore, praise justice as a good of that kind, explaining how – because of its very self 
– it benefits its possessor and how injustice harms them. …Don’t …give us only a 
theoretical argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what effect each 
has because of itself on the person who has it.114 
 
Socrates is charged with showcasing that justice in itself is worthwhile, and superior to 
injustice. I read this as a clear indication that they ask for proof that the soul will benefit 
from acting justly. They want to know that when they act justly, even if the just action they 
perform leads them to gain some form of disadvantage, they still did the right thing by acting 
just. Let’s say that a poor man on the brink of starvation comes across a bag of money, 
suppose further that the poor man finds out this bag of money previously belonged to a 
criminal who came by the money by selling drugs or the like, the criminal man is dead and 
the poor man knows this. The money belongs to nobody, yet if the poor man takes the 
money he is stealing, and for the sake of the example let us assume that it is always just not 
to steal, and that it in fact is stealing if the poor man chooses to take the money for himself, 
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rather than handing it over to the authorities. The challenge put to Socrates is to defend the 
notion that the poor man will be better off by acting justly and handing the money over 
rather than keeping it himself.  
The challenge appears even clearer in the second passage, by pointing out that they 
not “only” seek a theoretical argument they clearly don’t deny Socrates a theoretical 
approach, they in fact seem to ask him to make a general statement about justice before he 
showcases how it will, because of itself, benefit the person who has it. I read this statement 
to mean that they want Socrates to elaborate on the nature of justice before he shows why 
it is beneficial to a person to have this quality, and seeing as it is a quality and a virtue, and 
that they want to know what benefits it offers in itself, regardless of any rewards that they 
may reap because of it, I find it highly plausible that Socrates understood his challenge to 
first and foremost be how he would define justice and how he would show that it was worth 
having for its own sake. 
Socrates, as well as the interlocutors, never intended the defence to be of “Vulgar 
justice”, but rather of justice as it really is, and how it really should be understood, as 
something more than just “every man his due”. I do not, however, see Cephalus’ comment, 
or the phrasings of Glaucon and Adeimantus, as proof for the existence of Platonic justice in 
the dialogue before Socrates introduces it, but I do think that comments like these show that 
there exists a notion of justice as including more than just “every man his due”, and that 
some sense of justice as a benefit, or a disadvantage, in the soul exist within the group of 
interlocutors. 
 The instance where Polemarchus brings the notion of “every man his due” into the 
conversation is of great importance as it sees him immediately having to answer the claim 
that made his father fall short: a man that is out of his mind must not be allowed to be given 
what is owed him (331e). Polemarchus then rephrases that “every man his due” means that 
one should do good to ones friends and harm to ones enemies (332a-b). This interpretation 
is during Book I refuted by Socrates, and it’s placement in the argument-chain that takes up 
Book I is of special interest when considering if this in fact is the notion of justice Glaucon 
seeks a defence for in Book II (as Sachs claims). The argument evolves from Cephalus’ take 
on justice – “speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred” (331c) – and is 
closely related to this take. When Thrasymachus intervenes and holds that justice in fact is 
“nothing other than the advantage of the stronger” (338b-c) Socrates response is to further 
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inquire about this definition until he finds faults in it. He argues against Thrasymachus in the 
same manner as he argued against Cephalus and Polemarchus, and the subject-matter 
seems to be equally treated as the preceding notions of justice. Thrasymachus bursts into 
the conversation saying that Polemarchus and Socrates have been talking “nonsense” and 
that they are idiots for “giving way to one another” (336b). So when Glaucon begs Socrates 
to fully defend justice he recaps that most men would only see value in having a reputation 
for justice, but that is more burdensome than injustice and therefore should be avoided if 
possible (358). This exchange happens at the very start of Book II, directly following Socrates 
refutation of Thrasymachus, and the importance of this is the final, concluding arguments 
used by Socrates: 
 
 …a bad soul rules and takes care of things badly and that a good soul does all these 
things well? 
 It does. 
 Now, we agreed that justice is a soul’s virtue, and injustice its vice? 
 We did. 
 Then, it follows that a just soul and a just man will live well, and an unjust one badly.115 
 
I see this passage as a natural conclusion to the notion introduced by Cephalus that there 
exist bad and good men, Socrates introduces the concept of soul before he elaborates on 
Platonic justice, and the argument is solid enough that Thrasymachus has no counter-
arguments. The reason Glaucon brings the challenge to Socrates is in my view not to defend 
what he refuted in his conversation with Thrasymachus – that injustice is more profitable 
than justice – but rather to discover the true nature of justice, and if I am right there is no 
fallacy because the guidelines given to Socrates is being followed. The reason for believing 
this is the phrase by Glaucon: “I want to know what justice and injustice are and what power 
each itself has when it’s by itself in the soul.” (358b) Glaucon seeks the answer to what 
justice and injustice are, but, more so, he already assumes that they are related to the soul 
and that both justice and injustice harbours there. It should from this be no reason to 
assume that Socrates defends something else than what he was tasked with. 
 
                                                          





The problem is defined and clarified by Sachs and Vlastos, while my suggested solution(s) to 
the problem has at its core the aspect of a possible hybrid-theory proposed by Annas, and 
the idea that justice is already linked to the soul before Socrates makes that point is hinted 
at in an article by Schiller116. 
By interpreting Plato’s theory as a hybrid between act- and agent-centred, or spiritual 
and physical, the shift and fallacy Sachs claim exist disappears, by showcasing that Socrates 
gives plenty of incentives and proof that there exist a standard for just actions we see that 
Socrates answers the challenge he was given. The task he embarked on was never intended 
to be a defence of only just actions superiority over unjust actions, there was an 
understanding among the interlocutors before Socrates makes his definition that justice 
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VIII: Solving the Problem of Motivation 
 
The problem of motivation has its origin in Socrates’ claim that it is always in our best self-
interest to act justly (358a), but when the philosopher kings will rule the city they must be 
forced to do so (520a-b), to solve this problem it must be shown that it is in the philosopher 
kings best self-interest to rule, with the added complication that it must be the best course 
of action for them not only because of what comes from the fact that they rule, but that the 
actual ruling is just and serves the best self-interest for them as well. 
Socrates does here proclaim that justice is not only to be valued because of what 
comes from justice (happiness), but that justice is also to be valued in itself: 
 
Socrates, he [Glaucon] said, do you want to seem to have persuaded us that it is better 
in every way to be just than unjust, or do you want truly to convince us of this? I want to 
convince you, I [Socrates] said, if I can. …I myself put it [justice] among the finest goods, 
as something to be valued by anyone who is going to be blessed with happiness, both 
because of itself and because of what comes from it.117 
 
Any theory that aims at solving the issues found in the Republic must showcase that justice 
is worth having in itself, i.e. that it is always in our best self-interest to act justly. A recurring 
issue is that many commentators does not give sufficient reason for why the philosopher 
would choose to rule without explaining why he indeed is acting out of self-interest when he 
does. 
 I will argue that there exists proof in the Republic that Socrates and the brothers view 
themselves as founders of the ideal city, and that this fact directly helps solve the problem of 
motivation. This is an approach I have not seen in other articles, nor have I noticed any 
commentator that highlights this fact at all. In addition it will be necessary to view the 
education of the philosopher kings with this mind. I will also take into consideration Krauts 
point118 that many of the conclusions and comments made by Socrates are being made while 
the theory is still being developed, and that it is important to see the argumentation in the 
previous Books in light of the final conclusions being made in Book IX. 
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 I will also make use of Singpurwalla’s concept of unification119 as an important part of 
my own theory. 
 
VIII.1 Socrates’ arguments is in development up until Book IX, and must be viewed as such 
 
Kraut presents his view that the arguments Socrates makes are incomplete until he makes 
his conclusions in Book IX, alongside what he calls “an argument from silence”, this 
argument is presented to illustrate that Socrates does not confirm nor refute that it will be in 
the philosopher-king’s best self-interest to rule.120 Glaucon asks whether the philosophers 
will live a worse life because they must rule, Socrates answers simply by saying that the goal 
of the city is not to make the philosophers as happy as possible. (519d-e) “…he [Socrates] is 
still in the midst of constructing the ideal city, and is very far from completing his argument 
that justice pays.”121 The idea is that Socrates creates the theory as he discusses with his 
interlocutors, and as such the theory he puts forth is not complete until Book IX, and this fact 
must be taken into consideration when one reads different statements of the Republic that 
may appear troublesome. The passage in which Socrates claims that the philosopher kings 
must be forced to rule (520a-b) is therefore to be viewed in light of the complete theory that 
is not finished until Book IX, and by applying Kraut’s argument I believe it can be defended. 
Kraut elaborates on how he views Socrates claim that the goal is to “make the city as happy 
as possible”, not any one individual or part of the city as happy as possible. 
 
There is no thought here that we ought to heap up individual happiness in such a way 
that the sum is as high as possible – accepting, if we must, the sacrifice of some for the 
sake of the total level of well-being. Plato’s model emphasizes the importance of the 
relation between citizens: each must be made happy, but each must also contribute to 
the happiness of others; and none is to be so happy that others are as a result 
unhappy.122 
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The happiness of the city is the primary goal of the just city, and in order to achieve this 
every part of the city must be happy. Kraut uses this as a foundation when explaining why it 
is just that the philosophers rule, and it must be viewed in light of the information about the 
Forms that comes to light between Book IV and Book IX: 
 
The forms are a just order, and we fail to imitate them if we refuse to do what is 
required of us in human relationships. Once the philosopher sees why ruling is just, she 
will agree that it would be contrary to her interest to continue her purely philosophical 
activities, even though such activity would in other circumstances be more 
advantageous than political activity.123 
 
I think Kraut has the right idea, although I do not fully agree with some of the things he 
argues. It is in my view the goal and purpose of the ideal city that each of the parts of the 
city be as happy as humanly possible, Kraut argues that no class must be so happy as to 
make any of the other classes unhappy, but in my reading this is not possible. Kraut phrases 
it like this in order to explain why it is just that philosopher kings rule, because he sees 
Socrates passage about the philosopher spending time contemplating the Forms as the 
philosopher being at his most happy, and that the city would suffer because the other 
classes would be unhappy should the philosophers spend all their time contemplating the 
Forms and no time ruling the city. So in Krauts defence the philosopher chooses to rule 
because he will want to imitate the Forms and they require a proper harmony in human 
relationships, which for the philosopher requires ruling the city. What remains unanswered 
in Krauts defence is why Socrates and his co-founders must force the philosophers to rule, 
Krauts defence says that the philosopher will see that it is just that they rule but he evades a 
direct answer to why it would be necessary to force just people to be just. 
 The reason why I feel it is important to note the point Kraut makes – the argument 
that Socrates makes is not finished until Book IX – is that I too read the Republic in a manner 
that Socrates always has the Forms in mind when he discusses justice in Book II through 
Book IV, and that this is important to keep in mind when one revisits the arguments being 
made in these books.  
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VIII.2 Socrates (and his interlocutors) are founders of the city 
 
The following passage is completely my own theory, and most of it is based on logical 
necessities that follows from a certain reading of the Republic.  
The ideal state in the Republic is not laid out as how a fully operational ideal city 
functions, rather it is explained how it can be implemented. This is exemplified by utterances 
of the kind that certain poetry must be abolished124, the “noble lie” (414e415c), as well as 
the fact that Socrates frequently establishes that he, alongside his interlocutors, are the co-
founders of this city (379a, 519c). The importance of this fact becomes visible when 
considering Plato’s theory of justice in the dialogue. Any shortcomings this theory have in 
regards to the phrase that justice is something that always is best, in itself and what comes 
from it, alongside the fact that acting justly will lead to the best, happiest life that can 
possibly be lived, must be seen in this light. It is troublesome to explain why the philosopher 
kings would want to rule the city when they are happier when they are allowed to 
contemplate the Forms. This issue can be avoided when one sees the situation described by 
Socrates for what it really is. Socrates is explaining, as a founder of this city, how the 
Guardians must be raised. As a founder he necessarily speaks of the first generations of 
philosopher kings and how their education would be laid out when he in his position of 
founder is in charge of this, and when doing so he explains all the things they must be led 
away from, this is what leads to the censorship of many of the tales and conceptions 
common to the Athenian society.  
To further illustrate that Socrates mainly discuss the founding of the ideal city, rather 
than how the ideal city functions fully developed and settled, consider that in the fully 
functional ideal city tales of this kind would not even need to be censored. Primarily because 
the inhabitants would not believe the parts that are being censored, they have been 
“tricked”125 for so long that the censorship implemented by Socrates and his co-founders are 
now the reality. The censorship would according to Socrates not be “trickery” seeing as 
Socrates makes the point that “a god must always be represented as he is” (379a). So the 
censorship is meant to ensure that the society have only information about the truth, and in 
                                                          
124 Republic, End of Book II and start of Book III, and the final censorship in Book IX that sees Socrates banish 
poets from the ideal city altogether. 
125 «Tricked» only in the sense that they are being misinformed in order to bring about the best possible life for 
all the inhabitants of the city, themselves included. 
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the ideal state the guardians will make sure that nothing but the truth is being presented in 
every circumstance. The noble lie is here an obvious issue, but the noble lie is meant as an 
instrument for controlling the people, and it can be viewed as a sort of metaphor for each 
person’s personal talents, and by so doing see that it in fact is true when one says that there 
is gold in the guardians soul, silver in the auxiliaries, and bronze and iron in the producers. It 
is truth “once removed” as it were. It is truth explained in a way that the uninitiated 
populace can understand, and as such a trait that the guardians can make use of whenever 
they are explaining the true nature of any subject to the other classes. The overarching goal 
is that the right and true thing is being followed and to some extent being understood. 
It is the realization that these guidelines primarily deal with the first-generation of 
guardians, and that it is coined at them when they are being educated, that we can 
understand the flaw in using utterances about these stages as a critique for Plato’s 
overarching theory that justice always is best. When Socrates is discussing the importance of 
forcing the guardians to rule he is discussing how to force the first generation of philosopher 
kings to rule. This is illustrated by the use of the phrase that they must not be allowed to do 
what they are today: refuse to return to the cave and share their labours and honours (519c-
521b). The point here is that he is drawing a direct line to the what a philosopher would 
want to do “today” and the philosopher kings that he is discussing, indicating that the 
philosopher of today and the philosopher-king in question would have the same desires. The 
two different philosophers might very well have the same desires because the philosopher 
of “today” and the first generation philosopher-king have not had the privilege of receiving 
the fully-fledged proper education that the Kallipolis eventually can offer. So the question of 
motivation for these first-generation philosopher kings is a question that has less and less 
relevance for each new generation of philosopher kings that receive a better education and 
upbringing than the generation before it. The first generation of philosopher kings will be 
brought up in the educational program established by Socrates and his interlocutors126, a 
program that, however good it may be, is not based on insight into the Forms, and as a 
result cannot claim to be the best possible educational program. When Socrates is discussing 
the specifics of education and upbringing he is only pointing to what he calls “patterns” 
(412a), these patterns are based on moderation and harmony within the soul. The education 
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and upbringing is meant to bring each of these parts to “being stretched and relaxed to the 
appropriate degree.” (411e-412a). When one takes this into consideration the vast majority 
of the education is by Socrates handled as something that is best executed when the end-
goal is that the different parts of the soul are “being stretched and relaxed to the 
appropriate degree”, but there exists no concrete plan for how to do this. The closest we get 
is information about the nature of the stories they are allowed to hear, and that they should 
be fit. Very little else is concretely said about how the education will lead to the end goal 
that is being discussed and agreed upon. I take this to mean that Socrates does not have the 
answer for the specific way to educate and raise these would-be philosopher kings, rather 
the specifics will be visible through trial- and error-based education and upbringing. The 
overarching end goal presented by Socrates, as well as his general outlines will stay the 
same, but how to actually bring this vision to fruition will take several generations, and 
several different approaches. 
So the first generation may not even be well enough educated that they will ever 
reach the Forms themselves, but they will be likely to reach further than what Socrates and 
his company have, or can hope to reach, and as such they will reconsider the different 
aspects of the city, and everything that the ideal city consists of, including the educational 
program. This will eventually lead to a generation of philosopher kings that will reach the 
Forms, and they will have a perfect sense of justice and happiness, whatever is just will be 
what is happiest, and their happiness will be directly linked to justice, because they have 
insight into the Forms. 
Socrates makes it clear – when revisiting the education for the philosopher kings in 
Book VI – that a proper education for the Guardians would lead to knowledge of the Good. 
My point here is that this knowledge does not necessarily occur within the first generation of 
Guardians, but they do build upon whatever insight Socrates inhabits and go from there, 
eventually a generation that has built upon all previous knowledge will reach the Form of the 
Good, and then illuminate the other Forms so that true knowledge can be extracted. It is at 
this time the Kallipolis will truly come in to its full potential, seeing as it from then on will be 
revised to best imitate the nature of the Forms. Although not implicitly spelled out in the 
dialogue, I find that there is enough evidence of this reading just based on the fact that it is 
Socrates and his interlocutors that are the founders of the city and the creators of the 
education-system. Socrates never talks explicitly of a first or later generation(s) of 
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philosopher kings, but in his constant movement from explaining how things must be 
implemented – exemplified by Socrates and his co-founders need to force the guardians to 
rule – to explaining how it functions when fully implemented – exemplified by Socrates 
descriptions about the educational end-goals – I read Socrates to first and foremost wanting 
to elaborate on how the city comes to be, and that he has a vision for what such a city would 
look like when it is fully operational. The education for the Guardians are thoroughly spelled 
out, but completely lacks concrete methods for how to make it happen, the goals for each of 
the different stages are spelled out, but how to reach these are not explained. I see this lack 
of detail as indicators to how they envision the overarching functionality of the different 
parts of the city, but the details are left to be sorted properly out by the rulers. There must 
exist a first generation of rulers that don’t learn from mistakes of previous generations, 
these few must rely solely on what teachings Socrates and his co-founders might offer, but 
then as these take to ruling the city they will necessarily identify certain shortcomings in how 
they themselves were brought up and correct as much as they can in the following 
generation. This line of thought strikes me as quite clear when one sees the goals described 
by Socrates, but that these goals are goals unattainable to himself127, it is therefore 
necessary for the Guardians to work their way towards the Forms with the initial 
understanding of the Forms offered by Socrates, and then go from there. 
 If one revisit the arguments against Plato with this view in mind one can defend the 
phrase that the philosophers will need to be forced to rule (520a-b) with the fact that they 
have not yet reached the end of their education, and that perhaps the education they have 
been presented have not yet been perfected in accordance with the Forms. When they are 
fully educated in the right way the need to “force them to rule” will cease to exist, they will 
be fully aware of all their responsibilities, and they will perform them fully. Learning to rule is 
part of the education that the philosopher kings go through, and they are not fully educated 
until they master this art as well as the proper way of contemplating the Forms. So when it 
comes to the issue that the philosophers will not enjoy the “burden” of ruling, this can be 
explained by the fact that contemplation and ruling is a shared experience for the guardians, 
and they will not enjoy the actual performance of ruling, rather they will enjoy the fact that 
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they rule, because they know it to be just, as well as seeing that this is an action that will 
allow them to further bring about the Forms in the physical world. The guardians will both 
enjoy and not enjoy ruling, this is why it is not an issue that Socrates holds that they cannot 
enjoy ruling, but it is just that they rule, and whatever is just is best and leads to most 
happiness, which indeed having the guardians rule will do. The philosopher kings don’t enjoy 
ruling, but they know it to be just, and any action that is just will be enjoyable to them. They 
enjoy ruling because of their knowledge that it is just, but the actual performance of ruling, 
i.e. making laws and general governance, will not be enjoyable to them. 
 
VIII.3 The aim is to make the city as a whole as happy as possible 
 
To fully understand why the philosopher kings must rule it is important to examine the 
happiness of the city versus the happiness of the individual, although as I will argue the 
happiness of the city is directly connected to the happiness of the citizens, and vice versa. 
Socrates holds that it is not the object to make any one group or any one individual happiest, 
rather the focus is that the city as a whole should be as happy as possible: 
 
You are forgetting again that it isn’t the law’s concern to make any one class in the city 
outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city by bringing 
the citizens into harmony with each other through persuasion or compulsion and by 
making them share with each other the benefits that each class can confer on the 
community. The law produces such people in the city, not in order to allow them to turn 
in whatever direction they want, but to make use of them to bind the city together.128 
 
This leads to the interpretation that it may in fact be that justice leads to the most happiness 
when performing just acts, as well as for what comes from these actions, but the happiness 
in question is not that of the individual, rather it is that of the city.  
“…we aren’t aiming to make any one group outstandingly happy but to make the 
whole city so, as far as possible.” (419-420b). Socrates points out the fact that it is not the 
point of the laws of the city to make any one of the classes, or any one individual or group, 
exceedingly happy, rather the goal is to reach the highest possible happiness available for 
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the city as a whole, I read this to mean that all the individuals of the city is as happy as 
possible, but not on an individual level, rather a sort of utilitarian129 principle that all classes 
and individuals of the city should reach the highest possible state of happiness available to 
them without interfering with the happiness of the other classes. It is important to note that 
this means that in every decision being made in the city one would have to consider how it 
would affect the city as a whole, and that every decision should be made while having this 
overarching view of happiness in mind. Socrates says also in this passage, when answering 
Glaucons point that the philosophers are being treated unjustly when they must rule against 
their will, and the point Adeimantus makes that they will have no possessions, that even 
though they are derived of this it would not surprise him if they “were happiest just as they 
are” (420b). 
So when confronted with the issue that Socrates holds that justice leads to the 
happiest life possible, but on the surface it appears that the philosopher kings would be 
happiest when contemplating the Forms, but it is just that they rule, it appears that justice 
does not lead to the happiest life possible. This is solved by simply pointing to the fact that 
the happiness in question is in fact that of the city, and not of any one group or individual, 
but it is also a consequence of the city being happy that its inhabitants are happy. In other 
words, the philosopher kings could not be happier if they did not divide their time so that 
they may also rule in addition to contemplating the Forms, because the city would then 
suffer and not be happy, which in turn would lead to the individuals in the city not being 
happy, including the guardians. It is then a necessity for happiness, as well as being just, that 
the guardians take turns ruling the city. 
To summarize this far: the philosopher kings (when fully, and perfectly, educated) 
reason for ruling is that it is just, and that it will lead to the city, and as a consequence all the 
inhabitants of the city, being as happy as possible. They must be “forced to rule” (520a-b) 
because Socrates here is referring to the first-generation of philosopher kings that has not 
yet full insight into the Forms, and as a result does not fully comprehend that it is the most 
just and happiest course of action that they rule. It is also a part of the philosopher kings 
education to rule the city, and they will only have to be forced to rule as long as they are still 
being educated. When they have finished their education, as well as belonging to a 
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generation of guardians that have reached the Form of the Good, they will no longer have 
the need to be forced to rule. As a response to the fact that they will see that it is just and 
that it is the happiest course of action that they rule, but that the rulers must be the ones 
that least would want to rule (521b), one must consider the two sides the guardians portray 
when they rule (that they both enjoy and not enjoy ruling130).  
 
VIII.4 Implementing Singpurwalla’s “unification theory” to help solve the problem of motivation 
 
Rachel Singpurwalla presents a theory she calls “the unification theory” that lays the 
foundation for my take on the issue. The general idea is that a great number of passages in 
the Republic sees Socrates praising the concept of unity, order, or harmony (three different 
translations for the same concept described by Plato). It is a character-trait given to the 
greatest good for a city (462a-b), as well as being used to describe the nature of the Forms 
(475a; 479a-e; 500c-e). Pertaining to the soul Socrates says the most desirable soul is “entirely 
one, moderate and harmonious” (443e).  
 
…he [the philosopher] looks at and studies things that are organized and always the 
same, that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, 
he imitates them and tries to become as like them as he can. …Then the philosopher, by 
consorting with what is ordered and divine and despite all the slanders around that says 
otherwise, himself becomes as divine and ordered as a human being can.131  
 
Socrates reveals here two very important things in regards to his theory of justice, first that 
by imitating the Forms the philosopher will inhabit a quality translated in this translation 
with the word ‘order’, Singpurwalla comments that this quality has been translated by other 
commentators with, in addition to ‘order’, the words ‘harmony’, and ‘unity’. All three words 
give some indication that the quality has a structural ability, things must work in a certain 
                                                          
130 Kraut has a similar solution (Kraut 1999, 249), but in his reading the philosopher wants to rule because what 
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the remainder of his time contemplating the Forms. An issue here is how the act of ruling in itself is something 
that should be attractive to the philosopher-king, seeing as him ruling is just and justice is something one 
should want for itself as well as what comes from it. Kraut does not answer here why the philosopher would 
want to rule for the sake of ruling, unless I have misread him and he has the same idea that I do, that ruling 
imitates the Forms and the reason for not wanting to rule is the wish to stay among the Forms. 
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way, and with the translation of the concept with ‘harmony’ it appears that it must be a 
positive arrangement. With this in mind it appears that Socrates is telling us that by imitating 
the Forms the philosopher will become structured in a positive way and have order, unity, 
and harmony as main attributes. This in turn means that these are qualities that are very 
prominent in the Forms, seeing as it is through imitating them that one gains this ability. 
With the Form of the Good being the key to unlocking the rest of the Forms it is natural to 
assume that it is this Form that is the most important and the very best of all the Forms. It is 
therefore linked closely to the Form of justice, which is a concept Socrates places among the 
highest of goods, and it can itself be viewed as a sort of harmony, unity, and order. 
Considering it is these attributes one gains by contemplating the Forms, and the Form of the 
Good being the key, it will be this Form that will be the primary aim for such contemplation. 
The proposition is that this idea of unity goes beyond the mere individual and does 
include a feeling of unification with others as well, and that this is essential to our happiness, 
which a just life will lead to. The reason for believing that external unity, not only a 
harmonious soul, is important stems from Socrates description of the Tyrant: “So someone 
with a tyrannical nature lives his whole life without being friends with anyone, always a 
master to one man or a slave to another and never getting a taste of either true freedom or 
true friendship” (576a). The Tyrant lacks a harmonious soul, and Socrates showcases here 
that he lacks harmony or unity in his surroundings as well, the importance being that 
Socrates contributes both deficiencies as adding to his unhappiness. Had it only been a 
matter of deficiency of soul there would be no need to explain the external contributors to 
an unhappy life, an unjust life, but to be happy and to be able to be completely just, seeing 
as the just life will lead to the happiest life, one needs to see oneself as unified with others, 
that one’s own happiness relies on the happiness of others. This is what is being meant 
when Socrates explains that the goal is not to make any one class or group in the ideal city as 
happy as possible, but rather the goal is to make the city as a whole as happy as possible 
(420b-c; 466a). With this in mind it is easy to see that the philosopher would choose to rule, 
he would see his own happiness as a part of the whole city’s happiness, and alongside the 
argument that the philosopher will see it as just that he rules based on the harmonious and 
orderly nature of the Forms, something he will want to imitate in the physical world, we can 
argue that it is in the philosopher’s self-interest to rule. His own happiness is connected to 
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the other inhabitants of the city’s happiness, and he will realize it is just because of the 
structural nature of the Forms. 
It is logical to think that unity (or harmony/order) is a part of the Forms and as such a 
trait that the philosopher kings would want to imitate, but Singpurwalla’s theory can at best 
supplement a view on the Forms and the Form of justice as having a quality of unity to it. 
This is because Singpurwalla does not explain why it is a necessity that Socrates and his co-
founders force the Guardians to rule, in her view they will see that it is just because they are 
performing acts that help unify them with the rest of the citizens, and it seems unlikely that 
there would exist a need to force them to do something that Singpurwalla claims is 
something the philosopher would not only do by his own wish, but actually something that 
he might want to do more than contemplating the Forms. The view that need to be 
extracted is the mere fact that ruling has, as I have argued, a solid foundation in the Forms, 




The problem of motivation is thus solved because by viewing Socrates’ definition of justice in 
light of the whole Republic, most notably by seeing how the Forms come into play in earlier 
statements, we can see that the statement that the Guardians must be forced to rule is 
somewhat misinterpreted. Because the action of ruling is part of the education of the 
Guardians they will need to be metaphorically “forced” to rule, but when they realize that it 
is just they will go willingly to the act of ruling, both for the sake of ruling in itself and what 
comes from it, while also not enjoying the act so as to keep in line with the passage that they 
will be the best possible rulers namely because they will not enjoy it. The education of the 
Guardians is not complete until the need for forcing them to rule disappears, and the life of 
the Guardians consist of both ruling and contemplating the Forms, as such the education 
they receive will introduce them to both these aspects, and it is in this introductory phase 
that they will need to be forced. Their education does include an increasing understanding of 
the Forms, and when they reach a certain stage in this education they will realize that the 
justice that brings about happiness in the city is only possible if one sees oneself as part of 
the city’s happiness, and that one is unified with the other inhabitants. It is only by 
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performing one’s role in this city dutifully and perfectly that the city’s happiness will thrive, 

































IX: Solving the Problem of Possibility (PP) 
 
The problem of possibility stems from the fact that Socrates holds that it is in everyone’s 
best self-interest to act justly, but gives little incentive as to whether or not Platonic justice is 
available to everyone. If it is not available to everyone, in one form or another, then it is 
impossible for these people to act in accordance to how Plato thinks everyone ought to act. 
A theory that aims to defend Plato’s views would then also have to spell out why it is 
possible for everyone to be just, at least to some extent. 
 I will argue that Socrates gives enough evidence to prove that indeed everyone can 
be just. I will do this by showing that Socrates holds that there exists a spectrum of different 
states of justice and happiness, and that to be just one does not need to aspire to the level 
of the philosopher kings in regards to the Forms. The motivation for those unable to reach 
the Forms will be through indirect knowledge of the Forms, knowledge they acquire through 
the rule of the philosopher kings as well as from their love and mastery of their craft. 
 
IX.1 Everyone can be just and happy, but only the philosopher kings can be as happy as humanly 
possible 
 
Very few commentators deal with this issue, Annas mentions it in passing at the end of her 
article “Plato and Common Morality”, Kraut extends his theory to contain a reason for the 
producers to be just as well, but as has been explained132 this theory had fatal flaws. Cooper 
hints at divisions of happiness and justice for the different classes: “For Socrates, then, the 
just life led by all is at the same time the best, happiest life for each. At any rate, it is the best 
and happiest that their individual natural capabilities make possible for them.”133 Cooper 
seem to subscribe to a view that it is only the philosophers that can hope to live the best 
possible life, i.e. the happiest, most just life, but that the other citizens of the ideal city will 
only live the best possible lives that they can hope to aspire to. The just rule of the 
philosophers will lead to that everyone in the ideal city will live as happy a life as they can, 
neither Cooper nor Annas gives an explicit reason or argumentation for this.  
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 The second thing worth noting in this passage is that Socrates makes a note of the 
fact that there is a limitation to how well one can imitate and be in accordance with the 
Forms here in the physical world. He says that the philosopher that is successful in his 
imitation of the Forms will become “as divine and ordered as a human being can.” Had this 
been the very highest state possible it would not have been necessary with the inclusion of 
the fact that it is the highest possible state that a human being can reach, hinting that there 
are other beings that aspire even higher, or at least that there exist higher states. I interpret 
Plato to mean that the philosopher has the ability, of all other human beings, to aspire the 
highest in the search for the Forms, but it is only possible when the soul is discarnate that 
the soul can truly reach the very highest possible state, not only the highest possible for a 
human being. This comment also makes it clear that there exist different grades of how alike 
a human is to the Forms, with the successful philosopher being at the very top. 
I propose that when taken into consideration that there seems to be a spectrum of 
both justice and happiness, that everyone indeed can be just and happy, the conditions are 
that they live in the ideal state and that they follow the philosophers rule. Understanding 
justice and happiness as a spectrum, not ultimate states where you either inhabit said 
quality or not, one can see that it is best for all the classes to live in the ideal city, because it 
is only here that they can be as happy as possible for each of them. By following the rule of 
the philosopher kings everyone will live and abide by the Forms, they will indirectly apply the 
Forms in the physical world. When they do this they do not need to understand the Forms 
they are imitating, they need only to understand that it is just and right that they do it, and 
this understanding is what I believe the philosophers must give form to the citizens of when 
they “return to the cave”. The philosophers tell the people in terms they can understand 
what justice entails for them, how they can understand the Forms, and why it is right for 
them to act justly. Justice here understood as harmony of the soul and the doing and having 









IX.2 The producers and auxiliaries will have direct motivation to act justly because they will 
acquire indirect knowledge of the Forms 
 
Many of the commentators argue that it is the insight into the Forms134 that leads the 
philosopher kings to be able to be just, when one takes into consideration that 
contemplation of the Forms is an activity is exclusive to the guardians it appears that the 
other classes cannot be just. I believe Socrates gives us sufficient proof that the other classes 
as well will be introduced to the Forms, albeit not in the same manner as the guardians. The 
auxiliaries and the producers acquire second hand knowledge of the Forms by learning from 
the philosophers and by doing so acquire motivation for acting justly for justice itself: 
indirect knowledge is direct motivation. The allegory of the cave (514a–520a) sees the 
philosopher returning to the cave and enlighten the ones that remained, I see this as an 
analogy of not only the philosopher returning to rule the city, but as an image of how the 
philosopher kings will return from the “Island of the blessed” to inform the other classes of 
their discoveries135. Further illustrated by this passage by Socrates: 
 
 You’re [the philosopher kings] better and more completely educated than the others 
and are better able to share in both types of life [contemplating the Forms and the 
physical world of images]. Therefore each of you in turn must go down to live in the 
common dwelling place of the others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark. When 
you are used to it, you’ll see vastly better than the people there. And because you’ve 
seen the truth about fine, just, and good things, you’ll know each image for what it is 
and also that of which it is the image. Thus, for you and for us [non-philosopher kings], 
the city will be governed, not like the majority of cities nowadays, by people who fight 
over shadows and struggle against one another in order to rule – as if that were a great 
good – but by people who are awake rather than dreaming.136 
 
The philosophers give the people correct information, so the other classes will have correct 
knowledge about the Forms – including the Form of Justice – despite the fact that these 
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classes may not fully understand what it is, nor understand the concept of the Forms at all, 
but they will nevertheless have indirect knowledge of the Forms. Such knowledge will be so 
clear that it will make these classes realize that they must act in accordance with it, but they 
must not understand why they must do so, they simply realize that it is right to do it. A good 
picture of such a situation is Alcibiades in the Symposium137, although Alcibiades never truly 
grasped what he was being told and what he saw and experienced alongside Socrates. It 
should also be mentioned here that Alcibiades is hardly a representative for the average 
Athenian or an average citizen of the ideal city, but that is because Alcibiades is a much more 
headstrong and ambitious person than the average Athenian or member of the Kallipolis. I 
use Alcibiades as an example not because he is the average, but because he is the exception. 
Even such a man – remarkable as an ambitious general, as well as commonly viewed as 
impious – will put himself second in the face of the true nature of the Forms. A theory here 
could be that Alcibiades fails to live up to what he has seen alongside Socrates because the 
rest of society mimics these teachings to such a low extent that any insight reached would 
require a true philosopher to remain, whereas Alcibiades is not a true philosopher and 
would require that the rest of society was mirrored in the light of the Forms to truly act in 
accordance with them. In the ideal state the philosopher kings that rule are imitating the 
Forms in their rule and as such every aspect of the city is created in light of the Forms, and in 
such a city men like Alcibiades would not be diverted from the teachings of the Forms, the 
very same teachings he swears to and hold in such high regard when he experience them 
with Socrates, but discard when he is distant from Socrates. Socrates is the source for his 
insight into the Forms, but in the ideal city the philosophers will necessarily paint the entire 
society with the colours of the Forms, and the other classes will not be able to distance 
themselves to the indirect knowledge they receive of the Forms through the governance of 
the city by the philosopher kings. As such the indirect knowledge they acquire through the 
teachings of the philosophers gives direct motivation for acting justly for justice’s own sake. 
The very nature of the Forms will, even when not being experienced first-hand, make such 
perfect sense that it can offer direct motivation. 
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IX.3 The goal of the education in the ideal city is to instil the correct values and ideas into its 
citizens 
 
To fully understand how indirect knowledge is possible for classes beside the philosopher 
kings it is important to once again examine the education of the ideal city. The goal of the 
ideal education presented in the Kallipolis is to instil in the citizens a love of the correct 
ethical ideals (386a-391c). When these ideals are instilled, and a citizen loves these ideals, 
acting according to these ideals is in the person’s self-interest, just as much as the 
philosopher acting according to the Forms is his self-interest. This approach is presented by 
Eric Brown in his article “Minding the Gap in the Republic”, an article I covered earlier138. I 
believe this approach holds quite a lot of merit, mainly because it is quite clear from the 
dialogue that the censorship introduced on the educational program coined for the 
Guardians and the Auxiliaries is meant to instil certain values into the children. The problem, 
as far as I am concerned, is to show that this sort of education would also be available to the 
Producers, and thereby show that everyone in the ideal city would develop a love for the 
correct ethical ideals and act in their own self-interest when performing actions that has as 
no other benefit than being the just action. But first we must evaluate the evidence in the 
Republic for believing that at least the Guardians and the Auxiliaries will be brought up and 
educated in such a manner as previously described. 
 
And since he [the Guardian-in-training] has the right distastes, he’ll praise fine things, be 
pleased by them, receive them into his soul, and, being nurtured by them, become fine 
and good. He’ll rightly object to what is shameful, hating it while he’s still young and 
unable to grasp the reason, but, having been educated in this way, he will welcome the 
reason when it comes and recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself.139  
 
I read this as a clear indication that it is possible to acquire a love for what is just – 
independent of direct knowledge of the Forms – first and foremost because Socrates is 
describing without a doubt children that have not acquired any direct insight into the Forms, 
other than what they are being told through their education. This education, however, must 
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been seen as indirect knowledge of the Forms, and in this case, the Form of justice. This is 
then an indication that – if my earlier hypothesis about the philosopher kings returning to 
the ideal city to paint it with the colours of the Forms is correct140 – the philosopher kings 
will bring about the Forms in the physical world, and they will align the society to idealize 
what is most in accordance with the Forms. The education of all the citizens in the ideal city 
will be arranged so as to best possible give them the proper introduction to the values they 
should hold dearest according to the Forms, and the citizens will, because of this 
indoctrination of what is right, develop a personality that holds the right things in the very 
highest regard because of the right things themselves. They will find enjoyment in acting 
justly because of justice itself because they have been brought up to develop a love for this 
correct value. 
 
Or must we rather seek out craftsmen who are by nature able to pursue what is fine and 
graceful in their work, so that our young people will live in a healthy place and be 
benefitted on all sides, and so that something of those fine works will strike their eyes 
and ears like a breeze that brings health from a good place, leading them unwittingly, 
from childhood on, to resemblance, friendship, and harmony with the beauty of 
reason?141  
 
I read this passage to illustrate that the craftsmen of the ideal city will also mimic the Forms 
in the physical world, because their works will be “healthy” and serve as a part of the 
education of the Guardians, who above all the other classes, will require an education that 
will guide them towards the Forms. The fact that the work of the craftsmen will lead the 
young people “unwittingly” towards the Forms in the sense that they find their surroundings 
to be as alike to the Forms as possible, and that this is to a large extent the works of 
craftsmen who “are by nature able to pursue what is fine and graceful”. The craftsmen in the 
ideal city will indirectly mimic the Forms in their craft, they will work with what they “by 
nature” are most qualified to do and this work will be their main source of insight into the 
Forms. They cannot see the realm of the Forms as the philosopher kings can, but they can 
see the Forms through their work. This line of thought brings me back to the idea that 
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indirect knowledge is direct motivation, because the craftsmen will have three indirect 
sources to the Forms – the knowledge passed unto them by the philosopher kings, cryptic as 
it may be, they will also have their own experience of the Forms through their work, and as 
previously discussed142 they will also be subjected to the rule of the philosopher kings which 
will lead them to live in a society that imitates the Forms, and because of this the very city 
itself will serve as a source to indirect knowledge of the Forms – they will have not only be 
ruled from the outside by the Forms, through the rule of the guardians, but they will, as the 
other classes of the city, be ruled by the Forms internally.  
Contrasted to education the guardians and the auxiliaries receive which is based in 
physical training and a solid foundation in fields like poetry and music, the education that 
the craftsmen receive is first and foremost a technical one in a particular field: “In the city 
we’re establishing, who do you think will prove to be the better men, the guardians, who 
receive the education we’ve described, or the cobblers, who are educated in cobblery?” 
(456d My italics). The producers will receive an education that further develops their natural 
abilities in their field, it should be noted here that I read “natural abilities” in the context it is 
used in the Republic to more or less mean something along the lines of “ability to imitate the 
Forms”, so that any natural ability is a starting point towards the Forms. This education will 
lead to the craftsmen enhancing their natural abilities and as such make them better 
imitators of the Forms, something that in turn makes them love the fine and healthy things 
that they are learning to create and develop. They will therefore be subject to, from the very 
start of their education, the same unwitting moulding as the guardians-in-training, and they 
will as a result of this come to love the correct things and enjoy the performance of such 
things because of his external rule by the Forms through the Guardians, as well as his own 











IX.4 Reason has the potential to rule in the soul of every citizen in the ideal city 
 
Keeping in line with the previous passage it should be a clear indication that I think Socrates 
holds that reason rules in the souls of the producers as well as the other two classes, this 
transpires from my view that the producers mimics the Forms through their craft and the 
fact that they are being ruled both directly and indirectly by the Forms (although they don’t 
necessarily – and I find it highly unlikely – understand much of the Forms), but Socrates 
makes does make a point about the craftsmen not necessarily being ruled by the same that 
rules the best person (the philosopher kings): 
 
Why do you think that the condition of a manual worker is despised? Or is it for any 
other reason than that, when the best part is naturally weak in someone, it can’t rule 
the beasts within him but can only serve them and learn to flatter them? 
Probably so. 
Therefore, to ensure that someone like that is ruled by something similar to what rules 
the best person, we say that he ought to be the slave of that best person who has a 
divine ruler within himself. It isn’t to harm the slave that we say he must be ruled, which 
is what Thrasymachus thought to be true of all subjects, but because it is better for 
everyone to be ruled by divine reason, preferably within in himself and his own, 
otherwise imposed from without, so that as far as possible all will be alike and friends, 
governed by the same thing.143 
 
I read this not as a disclaimer that the producers can be internally ruled by reason, but 
rather as a reminder that the producers does not receive an education that is as likely to 
yield the proper soul harmony as the education the other classes receive. So the rule from 
without – the philosopher kings rule – is necessary to ensure that the craftsmen will act 
justly, although it may be that most of the craftsmen in the ideal state will be ruled internally 
by reason. 
 A more concretely evident passage of the Republic to indicate that everyone can 
inhabit justice – and, the way I read it, therefore also be capable of inner harmony and being 
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ruled by reason within – can be found in Book IV when Socrates is laying forth his first 
definition of justice: 
 
Or is it [what will make the city great by its presence], above all, the fact that every 
child, woman, slave, freeman, craftsman, ruler, and ruled each does his own work and 
doesn’t meddle with what is other people’s? 
How could this fail to be a hard decision? 
It seems, then, that the power that consists in everyone’s doing his own work rivals 
wisdom, moderation, and courage in its contribution to the virtue of the city. 
It certainly does. 




The inclusion here of “every child, woman, slave, freeman, craftsman, ruler, and ruled” is in 
my eyes a clear indication that everyone falls under the scope of Socrates definition, as a 
result the theory he presents is meant to include everyone. The passage is meant to 
illustrate what makes the city great, and how justice will function in the city, but the way I 
see it the city is very much an analogy for the soul, as well as being a description of how 
justice plays out between the different classes and how the just city will appear, therefore it 
must be taken into consideration what the passage means for the city and what it means for 
the soul. This passage seems quite clear in formulating that everyone must contribute in 
order to achieve a fully just city, in order for the city to be just the citizens must perform just 
acts, here explained as doing and having his own. Socrates explains that everyone must do 
his own work and not meddle with other people’s affairs because it is this that makes the 
city great (I read this to mean just), and when one adds the view that everyone has the 
ability to be ruled internally by reason it emerges a view that everyone can be fully just. The 
inclusion of the craftsmen mirroring of the Guardians in the sense that they too will from the 
earliest of their education develop a love of what they portray natural abilities in, it is 
possible for everyone to be just, and they will be just in the right sense because they will act 
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justly because of what comes from these actions, as well as the actions themselves, because 
of their developed love for the right things. 
 
IX.5 Implementing Singpurwalla’s “unification theory” to help solve the problem of possibility 
 
As with my proposed solution to the problem of motivation I present at the end of my 
argumentation the inclusion of the unification theory. This is because it is an important 
factor in a full understanding of Plato’s theory, as well as being important to complete my 
own defence of his theory. 
Singpurwalla holds that her solution (The unification theory) disproves that only the 
guardians can be just: 
 
I hope it is obvious, however, that this objection [only the philosophers can hope to be 
just] fails, since unity and connection with others is a fundamental and universal human 
value. The desirability of having unity with others is not something that only the just 
individual recognizes; rather, it is something that we all intuitively recognize and 
experience. This is why Socrates’ description of the tyrant is so effective: we see the 
value in being genuinely connected with others, and we recoil from the thought of being 
surrounded by people with whom we lack this sort of connection. Thus, we all have a 
reason to be just.”145  
 
The reason for wanting to act just is here based on a kind of “do unto others as you would 
like others to do unto you”-principle, it is a good foundation for explaining why everyone 
would want to be just, but not sufficient as a defence for why people that only base their 
understanding of justice on this principle would want to act justly for justice’s own sake, if 
nobody suffers from an act that u do why perform such an act justly if it is more beneficial to 
perform it unjustly? The solution is that this theory is not a self-sufficient theory, it must be 
viewed as an addition to how Socrates portray the just individual, the just city, and inter-
personal relationships. The aspect of being unified with other people and the fact that 
justice is in many regards a form of harmony must be understood as a foundation for how 
everyone can be just, not as a reason in itself. The unification comes from everyone having, 
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in one way or another, a love for the Forms and a love for being ruled by the Forms through 
Reason, either directly (this does not equal any direct knowledge of the Forms, rather it 
means that one is ruled by Reason and loves the right things for the thing itself) and as such 
being capable of being fully just, or indirectly and be only partially just (this is the rule from 
without, where the individual has no love for the right things for the sake of the right things, 
rather he acts right primarily for the sake of what comes from acting right. I would like here 
to spell out that I don’t believe this will be the case for very many individuals in the ideal 





It is possible for the lower classes to be just because the education they receive will lead 
them to develop a love for the right things, this is caused by their natural abilities in their 
different fields that leads them to produce things that imitates the Forms and as such gives 
them a love for the Forms, albeit an indirect love. They must be contrasted with the 
philosopher kings however, and it should be clear that the philosopher kings will be more 
just and more happy than the other classes in the ideal city, so what is possible for the 
producers is to be as just and happy as their roles allow, my point is that when they reach 
their own limit they will inhabit enough in regards to the justice to be able to qualify as just 
people.  
Justice has an aspect of harmony and unification to it that leads the inhabitants to 
see that it is right that they treat each other justly because their own happiness resides with 
the happiness of the city, and the inhabitants make up the city, therefore their own 
happiness depends on the happiness of others. The indication from Socrates that everyone 
has a part to play in “having and doing one’s own” makes it clear that his definition of justice 
is available to everyone. The producers will want to act justly because they find joy in 







X: Summary and Conclusive Remarks 
 
I have presented my suggested solutions to the problem of relevance, the problem of 
motivation, and the problem of possibility, and I will here show very generally how each part 
coincide with the others. The first thing I want to emphasis is that the Republic offers many 
interpretations in many directions that all can be used to support or attack different 
theories, I believe that this is because Plato actually presents several coinciding theories in 
the Republic, and that by viewing them together one will see the full picture of what is being 
presented. With that in mind I propose that to understand Plato one must rely on several 
different approaches in order to fully explain and defend his theory. 
 As Socrates elaborates on his theory it becomes clear that his theory in fact can be 
viewed as a hybrid of an act- and agent-centred moral theory, to be just one must attain a 
certain state of soul while also perform universally acclaimed just acts. Socrates is never in 
any danger of committing a fallacy because not only is he tasked with defending justice for 
what it truly is, but there is no commonly understood concept of justice as “every man his 
due” before Socrates is challenged, so Sachs’ claim is disproven. Furthermore one must view 
the Republic as a whole and as such see the educational aspect of the dialogue reflected on 
its previous passages. The philosopher kings that will need to be forced to rule are still in 
their education, they have not yet come to realize that it is just that they rule, because if 
they see that it is just they would do it regardless because they would be just. The just life is 
“doing and having one’s own”; for the philosopher kings this is a mixture of ruling and 
contemplating the Forms. They are motivated in their ruling for justice’s own sake because 
they have received an education that has instilled in them a love for the right things, and so 
they love ruling because they know that it is right, but, paradoxically (and necessarily), they 
do not enjoy the actual, physical chore of ruling. It is also coherent that the phrase “doing 
and having one’s own” has a dimension of unity in it, by doing and having one’s own 
everybody contribute in the best possible manner to a collective whole. Whenever one 
makes decisions one must take into consideration how it would affect the whole, or any part 
of the whole, i.e. other people. The education that the philosopher kings receive has the 
same foundation (built in some way around the Forms) as the education given to the 
auxiliaries and the producers, and as such every citizen of the ideal city will be able to be just 
for justice’s own sake. 
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 One issue that is not solved by my approach is that it still appears that justice is only 
available in the ideal city. I will say that because there seems to be many different aspects to 
justice that in order to be fully, perfectly just one must be a part of the ideal city, one must 
even be a philosopher-king in the ideal city. But for some of the other aspects of justice, like 
a notion of unity, or the performance of just acts to enhance soul-harmony146, it is possible 
to grasp and exhibit without the ideal city as a foundation. So it is possible for everyone, 
regardless of what city one lives in or upbringing one receives, to be partially just, but 
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